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From the Commander

by BG Richard W. Wilmot

The Intelligence Electronic Warare System Program Review (IEWSPR) has maintained a steady and progressive course over the past several months. Beginning with the selection and formation of three general officer panels, the SPR effort, sponsored by USAICS, has rapidly gained momentum and generated interest Army-wide.

New developments in doctrine, missions and technologies make this an appropriate time for the IEWSPR. The evolution of the Airland Battle doctrine has placed new and demanding requirements on Army IEW. These requirements stem from the basic premise that in order to effectively engage and defeat a modern ground force that fights by Soviet doctrine, the commander must "see deep" allowing him to attrite the enemy at multiple echelons, preventing the enemy from keeping his full combat force intact for the decisive engagement. Seeing deep also gives the commander the knowledge and time needed to organize his forces to best engage the enemy.

The depth of vision needed by the commander to influence the battlefield can be translated in terms of time or distance depending on mission, terrain,weather, level of command and other factors. A corps commander needs to know things that will impact 72 hours later. That could mean looking forward of the FLOT anywhere from 50 to 300 kilometers. The division commander needs to know what will happen in 24 hours. He may need to see 50 to 150 kilometers, again with terrain, weather or other factors being the determinant. As the level of command becomes lower, time compresses further, resulting in a brigade commander requiring information that can influence events in 12 hours.

IEW assets organic to the Army probably do not have all the requisite capabilities needed to see deep. Therefore, closer integration with intelligence systems of other agencies or services may be needed or new collection systems may be required.

Issues like this will be addressed by IEWSPR. To understand how the IEWSPR finds solutions to such questions it is necessary to understand the purpose and processes of the SPR. As stated in AR 11-4 (Army Programs System Program Review), "SPR's serve as intensified management measures to bring senior Army management consideration to subjects that require special attention because of priorities, unusual problems, or other circumstances." The first intelligence SPR was held in 1978. It proved to be very useful in setting a course for further development of IEW capabilities. Some of the ideas which came out of INSPR 78 include:

—Expediting the fielding of CEWI units
—Need for ASAS capability
—Productive use of IEW assets in peacetime

IEWSPR-82 will review our current capabilities and identify

(Continued on page 37.)

ACSI VIEWPOINT

by MG William E. Odom

As many of you know, I convened the "Tactical Intelligence Conference" at Fort Huachuca on 21 and 22 July. I brought together a large group of the Army G-2s and tactical intelligence commanders—including representatives from every corps and almost every division in the Active Component—with the faculty of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School to accelerate the writing of a capstone doctrine for today's tactical intelligence organizations. Because we have introduced the multi-disciplinary concept to tactical intelligence organizations and operations it is not surprising that traditional FMs are no longer adequate. The resulting voids in doctrine have been noted frequently by commanders, IG reports, and many observers of Army intelligence organizations, but why this conference at this particular time?

In my initial visits to units in FORSCOM, USAREUR, and Korea, it became clear to me that we are indeed lacking formal statements—i.e., FMs—of tactical intelligence doctrine. Many issues of doctrine seemed contentious. Lacking the umbrella guidance that FMs provide, many thoughtful and professionally able colonels and lieutenant colonels properly set about developing their own answers to questions of how to organize all-source intelligence centers, how to employ collectors, and how to support EW and OPSEC. Diversity in solutions was bound to develop. It has, and so have debates, but also a great deal of experience has begun to accumulate from exercises and training.

Many in the tactical units complained that the Intelligence Center and School should have already produced a new family of FMs. While I understand these sentiments, I believe they reflect wholly unrealistic expectations. Two or three years ago, I doubt that we had adequate experience on which to base an effective draft of FM 34-1. To be sure, those in charge of writing doctrine at USAICS could have drafted something, using their imaginations, but even the most brilliant MI field grade officers could not pull an effective scheme for how to organize and run G-2 shops and MI battalions out of the thin Fort Huachuca desert air. An effective doctrine can only come from clear thought based on practical experience.

From my field observations, it was obvious that we are rapidly accumulating experience sufficient to inform effective statements of doctrine. Some might argue that it is still too early. Our two Corps in Europe do not yet have their organic MI Groups. The 9th ID experience is too particular, not a basis for broad generalizations. Many MI battalions lack sufficient personnel and equipment to learn how best to operate in the field. I am more sanguine about what we have already learned, but I do agree that we are nowhere near ready to write the "last word" on doctrine in FM 34-1. Nonetheless, it is high time to write the "first word" on that doctrine.

To assist USAICS in getting this "first word" on paper, I decided that it was worth bringing the field experience to the School instead of waiting for the much slower process of USAICS faculty members traveling worldwide to gather and record the experience. A desirable by-product of this approach would be that G-2s and MI commanders from widely separated areas would have a chance to exchange professional insights, to teach each other and to discover how much common ground they unknowingly already shared.

Because two days is a short time, I decided to focus the conference on a few problem areas, ones where there seemed to be either significant differences from division to division, or confusion about how to resolve issues. The five key areas were IEW operations; intelligence support to OPSEC; the all-source intelligence center; collection management and joint and combined IEW operations.

It may be useful to share with you some points I made to keep the conference on the straight path to written doctrine. Naturally, views may differ on precisely what is meant by the word "doctrine." It seemed appropriate, therefore, to define the term rather explicitly. It is in my view, a set of rules and guidance on organization, procedures, processing, tactical spatial relations, and definitions of terms. A TO&E is a statement of doctrine. CTOC and DTOC layouts are doctrine. Message formats are doctrine. CTOC and DTOC layouts are doctrine. In other words, doctrine sets forth organization, structure, and process which permit us to coordinate all our intelligence capabilities in pursuit of the unit mission.

Doctrine is not tactics or strategy. Tactics and strategy concern the particular set of actions that are taken to accomplish a specific mission. They are less concerned with

(Continued on page 43)

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

by Lt. Col. Luther L. Potter, Jr. and Major Jack R. Donovan

This article is intended for division G2s and MI battalion commanders not blessed with 100 percent fill of critical officer and enlisted specialities and who do not possess state-of-the-art communications and collection assets. This "have not" portion of the intelligence community should have an insatiable appetite for ideas as it traverses that road between the shortfalls of the present and the promised windfalls of the future. The purpose of this article is threefold:

1. To provide one division's philosophy of tactical intelligence during this period of high demand and limited resources.
2. To identify a number of topics which require further exploration by the tactical intelligence community and, ideally, subsequent publication in this journal of the "how to" ideas developed.
3. To focus on five topics to share this division's interim solutions to these critical problem areas.

This discussion begins with some "philosophy." It is imperative to establish a firm base to guide the problem solving techniques by increasing efficiency to achieve our complex mission. The approach to tactical intelligence has been very pragmatic. Simple questions such as: What is required? Who can best do it? Where should it be done? An overriding question that colors responses to the last two questions is: What is possible? There is no time to develop schemes nor the means to implement complex systems that look good on paper and collapse in the field. Doctrine, when it exists, must be modified or created to accomplish the difficult task of telling the commander the enemy's intentions. We shy away from the word "intentions," but in the final analysis that is what the commander wants from the "2," not a current history report or a series of capabilities. Intentions are what the commander really needs in his decision-making process. For example, "Where is the enemy and what is he going to do?" The guiding principle of tactical intelligence must be that intelligence is of no value unless the commander can act upon it. Accepting this principle has enormous consequences for the tactical field configuration but also for the division of labor within the intelligence community.

In addition to the axiom that "if commanders can't use, we don't need it," —is another key principle that tactical intelligence concepts and specific functions are unique and do not fall into a standard combat arms or staff model such as field artillery or the G3. Although some aspects parallel to these organizations too often attempt to use artillery vocabulary to solve intelligence conceptual problems or to allow G3 requirements to dictate G2 organization and deployment is fraught with danger. Providing timely tactical intelligence to division commanders requires an approach which takes into account such functions as all-source collection management, or assessing intentions of a man known to you only by Fixed Target Indicators, Moving Target Indicators, and fragmentary SIGINT.

In meeting the commander's needs and solving intelligence problems, another factor that must be taken into consideration is that there is an absence of doctrine on several key issues. This is not a license to steal as it is a mandate to identify those substantive problem areas that every tactical intelligence officer must address and develop a set of solutions. Although it is tempting to call for an interim doctrine, given the disparity of division missions and unique circumstances, the call is for creating an environment conducive to the mutual exchange of "how to" ideas.

With the above pragmatic view in mind, a list of nine areas has been developed which highlight the major topics which need additional study. Practical experience and a review of existing literature reveal the following subjects have received limited or no treatment at all:

a. The G2/MI battalion



commander relationship.
b. How to organize for combat with personnel and equipment shortages.
c. Division-Corps interface.
d. Targeting techniques.
e. Collection management techniques.
f. Refinement of event analysis matrices and decision support templating techniques.
g. Intelligence training for G2/S/2 staffs, e.g., conduct and preparation of division-wide intelligence CPXs.
h. Utilization of terrain detachments, specifically development of graphics to support decision making.
i. Exchange of mini-computer software and ideas for conducting division-wide training of analysts.

The above list is incomplete and should be expanded. Each topic merits a full scale article that hopefully would generate a stimulating dialogue; 4th ID doesn't even have all the questions properly articulated, nor the answers. Until a central clearing house for intelligence related questions is established, that dialogue is critical. It is interesting to note that on questions of technique and doctrine in other branches, the branch school is the central clearing house. Sometimes in our branch one has to go to a major headquarters such as FORSCOM and USAREUR or even to a division to get questions on procedures and doctrine answered.

The first five subjects on the above list are the most critical and have the most significant impact on our ability to accomplish our mission. The discussions will be brief and placed in a general context. We will provide details upon request and welcome divergent views.

G2/battalion commander relationship

This relationship is critical. Although each division approaches the problem differently, the major factors influencing the division of labor appear to be personality and/or physical location. Although important (and sometimes overriding), neither of these factors should dictate the intelligence system for the unit.

There is only one officer in the division charged by the Commanding General with the analysis and production of the intelligence to meet the Commanding General's collection requirements: that officer is the G2. MI battalion commanders do not have any division collection requirements: they have no battlefield responsibility to insure analysis and production of intelligence—that is the G2's job. The MI battalion commander's job is to insure that his troops are trained, equipped, positioned and resupplied to accomplish their mission as defined by the G2's collection requirements. The CI, IPW, GSR, SIGINT/EW assets and TCAE are responding to G2 Collection Management tasking.

It is necessary at this juncture to do what the doctrine has not done and make "assumptions" concerning the respective roles of these two positions. The evolution of the Army Staff System and the best assurance that the mission of the division will be accomplished is to insure that the "senior" Intelligence Officer in the division is the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. He is the individual charged to provide the commander with accurate, timely assessments of enemy intentions. He is the individual interacting daily with the other members of the primary staff and he is the individual the commander turns to and asks, "What are they going to do, G2?" With this burden of responsibility, common sense and survival instincts dictate that the G2 must control those assets to insure that he can accomplish the mission.

Combat organization

The three officers and five enlisted provided by the TO&E fall far short of what is required. The MI battalion TO&E has a section within the Headquarters Company which can provide the G2 with a staff sufficient to meet these requirements—namely, the DTOC Support Element. In the 4th ID(M), a memorandum of understanding has been executed between the G2 and the battalion commander to formalize the placing of this element under the operational control of the G2.

The Chief of DTOC Support Element becomes the G2 Operations Officer and all members of the Element are in the G2 rating chain. Splitting the rating scheme between the battalion and the G2 is counter-productive and is a decisive factor detracting from the primary mission of the Element: to support the G2.

This structure is consistent with the original premise that intelligence is of no value unless the commander can use it. The man whose main mission is to insure this occurs, now has a staff under his control to orchestrate the accomplishment of this mission. Our tactical configuration takes this premise one step further: The TCAE has been incorporated into the G2 organization at the DTOC. The battalion commander doesn't need a Technical Control and Analysis Element. After all, what are the MI battalion commander's SIGINT/EW needs that he has to analyze?

His battalion is responding to Collection Management tasking; SIGINT is not so special or wonderful that it needs to be analyzed at some other location or under some other control than the rest of the division's information, i.e., the G2s All Source Production Section. Granted, an MI battalion commander looses a chunk of his empire, but the question to address is why does he need that particular chunk of empire to start with!

It is worth discussing this incorporation because the implications say much about what the tactical intelligence is all about in an area of secure communications limitations. The G2 operates in an environment in which not only is gaining maximum lead time essential as events in the division area of interest unfold, but he is also required to react immediately to combat developments or changes in priorities established by the commander. The G2 Collection Management system is his mechanism for responding to these changes. With the addition of the TCAE function at the Main, the G2, in conjunction with the G3, can then orchestrate the SIGINT/EW taskings as well as the tactical surveillance and other assets in a very rapid manner. Of equal importance, the status of each system and the analysis of the data is immediately available to the G2. Not only does this close physical proximity assist the G2 in establishing credibility and speed intelligence to the commander, but it also allows close interaction between other staff elements such as G3 Plans and FSE. There is constant dialogue here, and human nature—being what it

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is—face-to-face communications are far more expedient and efficient.

This combined organization reduced CMF 98 personnel requirements by 30 percent, reduced communications requirements by one Ratt and one FM SI secure radio, and eliminated one communication link. Furthermore, it resulted in no increase in the number of expandable vans in the DTOC. If the DTOC is destroyed, so is the battalion's technical control of its assets and the intelligence production effort. However, we submit that designing a configuration that will insure the survival of the primary intelligence control element in the event of the loss of the command group is ludicrous. To accommodate the requirement for an alternate control element, we have added the extra Ratt and FM SI Radio to the G2 Element at the TAC CP. These terminals monitor traffic until the TAC CP assumes control. Because of the personnel savings by consolidation at the DTOC, the TAC CP is also augmented with SIGINT/EW personnel. In addition, the supplemental communications equipment at the TAC CP provides a much needed redundancy in an era of imperfect systems.

Targeting

The details of the targeting system will not be developed here. However, some general comments concerning this approach should be mentioned. The central problem of targeting with limited artillery in a division in a European scenario is not finding a target, but pinpointing the right one. Assuming the Airborne Collection systems are operational, there should be a proliferation of "things" to sort out. But this information is not of "forward observer" quality; it consists of indicators which must be filtered by an analyst who has access to the total all-source intelligence picture. Certain preplanned targets which meet specific criteria should be flashed through the system to the gun. In terms of volume, the numbers of targets do not warrant decentralized dissemination of entire systems such as SOTAS to DIVARTY. The DTOC is the obvious place for this filtering process. We have dedicated a full-time NCO to insure rapid screening of combat information for forwarding to the FSE who in turn makes appropriate distribution. This targeting NCO works closely with the Field Artillery Intelligence Office from the FSE in the development of target priorities and plans for future operations. To avoid duplication of effort the FSE is our central point of contact for all targeting and consolidates requirements from Chemical, ALO and EW Officers.

Division/corps relationship

This subject has received no treatment in the doctrinal literature and is probably more important than all the previous topics in terms of its impact on the division accomplishment of the mission. The Fulda Gap may be actual or imagined, but the division "intelligence gap" is real. Theoretical ranges aside, given terrain limitations on ground-based target acquisition systems—both radar and tactical SIGINT—the division commander can currently shoot with organic artillery farther than he can "see" with his organic collection assets. Without an airborne collection system, the division's dependency on corps is obvious for a high volume, detailed, near real-time portrayal of indicators from the FLOT forward to the limit of the division's area of **interest.** The situation is complicated by the Corps' emphasis on "deep targeting" in support of the extended battlefield. The problem has been validated on every FTX/CPX to date. A possible solution may be to have those corps collection systems with range within the division area of interest tasked solely by division, with corps collection managers arbitrating priorities and insuring rapid processing and dissemination of collected data to appropriate requesting division. To insure the expeditious execution of this function, perhaps a cell should be created at corps consisting of division collection management representatives to facilitate the process. Whatever solution is agreed upon, the problem must be resolved.

Refinement of events

A series of division-wide courses encompassing the various chapters were given by G2 NCOs to all intelligence officers and enlisted analysts. The purpose of the instruction was not only to introduce the techniques, but also to establish a common vocabulary within the community. Since these techniques have not been taught in detail at the intelligence school, the

classes were "required" and were well received. One of the most important objectives of the classes was to emphasize the fact that an actual battlefield is not a neat array of unit symbols. The second echelon regiment, for example, may in fact be more realistically portrayed by a series of MTI, FTI, and reconnaissance sightings strung out along multiple routes over 70 km. Displaying follow-on units in this manner greatly facilitates application of target areas of interest, names areas of interest, and other templating techniques. It also accentuates the close relationship between the ASP analytical effort and the challenge for the collection manager to orchestrate limited assets to collect at the right place at the right time. In addition, a special project was completed which displayed various Soviet regimental-size units in movement-to-contact formations. Relying upon multiple sources, a detailed listing of type vehicles and separation distances were drawn on a template approximately eight feet long. This classified reference document has proven invaluable in the generation of master incident lists in preparing CPXs and in training analysts and collection managers.

Summary

The key to tactical intelligence is producing in a timely manner that product which a commander can act upon. Given the personnel and equipment shortages, coupled with an imperfect communications system, intelligence organization should be tailored to insure assets are consolidated at critical points, with emphasis on face-to-face communications and centralized control. In the absence of clear doctrine on such significant issues (division/corps intelligence relationships, G2/MI battalion commander responsibilities), an open dialogue should begin addressing these important issues. We hope this article is a springboard for discussion and change where necessary. The military intelligence battalion TO&Es, and the thrust of Division 86 should not deter units from developing interim systems to accomplish the mission prior to the promised windfall of assets to implement the proposed doctrine.

Lt. Col. Luther L. Potter Jr. was commissioned in the MI branch in 1966. He holds a BA in English from North Carolina State University and an MA in Political Science from Appalacian State University. Potter has served with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 18th Airborne Corps and 8th Infantry Division. He was the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) G2 before his current assignment as commander of the 104th MI Battalion (CEWI), 4th Infantry Division (Mech).

★

Maj. Jack R. Donovan enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1965 and received an MI branch OCS commission in 1967. He holds a BA and MA in Public Administration from Southern Illinois University. Donovan has been assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division and is currently serving as the Human Resources Officer of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Comments from the field on Tactical Intelligence

MI personnel of the Institute for Military Assistance (TRADOC) and the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (FORSCOM) read the article by Lt. Col. Potter on Division G2/MI Battalion Commander issues with sympathy. We are deeply involved in drafting an operational concept and revised TOE for the MI Company (CEWI) of the Special Forces Group. ***Though Special Forces share few other considerations in common with the conventional forces, light or mechanized, the same question over primacy of the (supporting) MI Company Commander versus the (supported) Special Forces Group S2 emerged as a basic issue which defied simple remedy. It is apparent that the MI Company Commander tends to be the focus of peacetime priorities, while the S2 quickly becomes the focus when the Group is configured for war.*** Nonetheless, the MI Company Commander retains his importance in providing complex equipment and highly trained personnel in diverse skills. Increasing reliance on intelligence gathered, analyzed or transmitted by high-tech equipment has the potential to make management of personnel, training, and equipment (by the MI Company) rival the importance of managing a detailed collection plan (by the S2).

The following comment is in reference to Capt. Green's article on page 24.

The Office of the U.S. Army Special Security Command at TRADOC reviewed the article. They questioned the validity of the article's reference to the Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS), because the system has been deleted from procurement.

TROJAN MOUNT

bringing the signal to the troops

The TROJAN MOUNT signals intelligence training site at Fort Bragg, N.C., represents a positive aggressive approach toward the difficult Army question of "how to train and maintain the force in peacetime." SIGINT training requires radical thinking to effectively deal with training shortcomings and still support the commander's mission requirements.

TROJAN MOUNT initiates the concept of "bringing the signal to the troops." It is a state of the art antenna facility where tactical SIGINT units can deploy, plug in and operate in a real time, live signal environment without leaving the continental U.S.

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The program emphasizes intercept training (voice, Morse code, non-Morse and printer), transcription training (voice), traffic analysis training, SIGINT reporting training and collection management training.

Use of the TROJAN MOUNT facility will be cost effective, reducing the amount of REDTRAIN funds per soldier and possibly allowing more soldiers to be trained with more training periods.

The site's security requirements have been established by the XVIII Airborne Corps special security office and are the responsibility of units using the facility. Personnel training at the TROJAN MOUNT site must be cleared for access to Special Intelligence (SI) material.

Units using the training site must provide their own equipment. Some excess equipment and a shelter have been installed at the TROJAN MOUNT site, but units are urged to bring TOE equipment to insure the best possible training. Fort Bragg units will not be tasked to provide any tactical intercept equipment.

The TROJAN MOUNT site is located in a vast wooded area less than three kilometers from Fort Bragg and provides an excellent bivouac and tactical training area. Units are responsible for all administrative and logistical support. The TROJAN MOUNT officer, after receiving a formal request for use of the site, will provide limited support with an information package telling how and where to request resources from Fort Bragg.



Technical guidance can be requested from the TCAC, 18th Airborne Corps. Additional information, requests for information (RFIs), echelon above corps and national support, and communication support systems are presently available by using or tasking resources at Fort Bragg.

TROJAN MOUNT maintenance is the responsibility of the assistant chief of staff, G2/DSEC. Limited maintenance of user HF equipment is provided by the Fort Bragg Antenna and Signal Maintenance Team. General police and upkeep of the site is the responsibility of the unit using the site.

Special training for operators and analysts is available on request. This training is a "side saddle" approach and is only intended to insure proper directives, methods and transition to live operators is accomplished.

Requests for use of the site should be sent to Commander, 18th Airborne Corps, ATTN: AFZA-DS-C-SI (TROJAN MOUNT), Fort Bragg, NC 28307. Telephonic inquires on use of the training site prior to making a formal request are encouraged, but formal approval will not be granted until a written or electronic message is received. As a minimum, the request will include the specific designation of the unit participating in the training; specific training objectives including tasks, conditions and standards; the desired training date; a list of personnel by MOS and grade; type and number of equipment to be used and a point of contact with telephone number.

After Action Reports for each deployment are to be submitted to the above address not later than 15 working days after training is completed. As a minimum, the report will include training objectives completed, comments on the signal environment pertaining to supporting training objectives, coordination problems and any recommendations for improvement.

Points of contact for the TROJAN MOUNT project are CWO3 Kolosvary and SFC Marshall, phone number (919) 396-7445, Autovon 236.

MI, TNW and Chemical Munitions

by Cpt Jonathan S. Lockwood

Although the "integrated battlefield" concept has been around for some time, insufficient attention has been given to the demands on the MI officer at the brigade level and below in a chemical/nuclear environment. This article will define the nature of a nuclear/chemical battlefield and illustrate the decisive role the MI officer plays in determining victory or defeat.

The Impact of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The development of tactical nuclear weapons has increased the offensive potential of individual units in a way that the ability of any given unit to withstand their destructive power and still maintain cohesion is virtually negligible. Rockets and high performance aircraft have reduced the time factor to block or evade such an attack once it has been launched. This is corroborated by Soviet military theorists such as A.A. Sidorenko in **The Offensive:** ***. . . During the entire history of military art, no one weapon had such sudden and rapid influence on the nature of the offensive and on the conflict as a whole as did nuclear weapons. Their employment in the battle and operation permits inflicting large losses in personnel and equipment on the enemy almost instantaneously, destroying, paralyzing, and putting out of action entire podrazdeleniye, chast', and even soyedineniye (subdivisions, regiments, and divisions or corps respectively—JSL), and thereby changing the relation of forces sharply in one's favor and destroying structures and other objectives as well as enemy centers of resistance and frustrating his counterattacks and counterblows.***[1]

Any significant concentration of one's own forces in preparation for either attack or defense would be inadvisable. It would be difficult to receive a timely warning of an enemy nuclear strike in order to disperse friendly forces. Soviet military theorist, V.Y. Savkin, contends that the use of massed nuclear weapons fire "will ensure the attacker of a decisive preponderance of forces and will create for him favorable conditions for attaining high rates of advance. There will not be a requirement for concentrating on the main axis such an enormous mass of troops as was the case in the last war."[2] Furthermore, it is asserted that the nuclear battlefield will be characterized by rapid and enormous changes in the tactical situation. Sidorenko argues:

The mutual employment of nuclear weapons, the high mobility of the troops, and the great saturation of the battlefield with tanks will lead to rapid and sudden changes in the situation in the course of the offensive. If, in the last war, no substantial changes in the situation usually occurred during an hour with the attackers' advance at a rate of 1-2 km per hour, now the situation on the battlefield changes by minutes and even seconds rather than by hours . . . Under these conditions, commanders and staffs should consider and value not only hours, but also minutes and sometimes even seconds and should manifest a high operational quality in their work.[3]

Soviet theater nuclear doctrine indicates the Soviet military leadership will not mass their forces because of the existence of NATO's TNW arsenal, regardless of how ill-suited for battlefield employment the weapons might be. However, the Soviets plan to compensate for their dispersal of forces in space by means of the massed use of nuclear weapons fire coupled with high rates of advance along multiple axes. Sidorenko argues that "with the great destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the high mobility of the attacking troops, there is no necessity as formerly to concentrate a tremendous mass of troops and combat equipment on narrow sectors and for actions on a continuous front. . . "[4]

Soviet theorists anticipate the possibility of nuclear counterattacks on the part of the defender. They plan to break through into the depth of the defense and assault vital objectives before NATO forces can react effectively.[5] Savkin contends that a "high tempo of advance" not only "reduced the danger of their destruction by the enemy's nuclear strikes," but it also results in an effective increase in the overall combat power of the attacker: ***Thus, high rates of attack permit neutralizing many strong aspects of a modern defense, but this does not exhaust their significance . . . with high rates of advance and effective neutralization of the enemy by fire, the attacker suffers fewer losses in personnel and equipment. With an increase of rates of attack, a***

further decrease in losses occurs.

It should be added that with high rates of attack there is a considerable increase in losses to the defender. The rapid wedging of attacking troops into the defense disrupts control and disorganizes the enemy, as a result of which there is a reduction in his troops' combat effectiveness, and favorable conditions are created for his encirclement, capture, and defeat piecemeal.[6]

MI and Defense Against TNW

The significance of the nature of the nuclear battlefield to the MI officer, particularly at the tactical level, cannot be overstated. The S-2 at all levels will not have time to analyze a situation when nuclear weapons are present and likely to be used. A high premium will be placed upon timely identification of the enemy's means of nuclear attack. This does not merely entail the location of nuclear missile batteries in their firing positions. (Although this is a vital indicator, it is probably too late to do you much good unless you have anticipated the deployment of nuclear weapons in that particular location, have kept the commander informed at all times, and have coordinated beforehand to have the air and/or artillery assets available for the quick destruction of those missile batteries.) If the S-2 cannot predict when and where the nuclear means are going to be in firing position until they have actually done so, the next (and probably last) battlefield indicator he is likely to receive will be the destruction of his CP.

Recognizing the nuclear emphasis of their operational doctrine and theory, Soviet military analysts have not ignored this problem. The decisive role played by intelligence in combating enemy means of nuclear attack is stated in **The Offensive:** ***The success of the battle against enemy tactical nuclear means depends first of all on***

SUMMARY OF SELECTED CHEMICAL AGENTS

The summary of selected Chemical Agents shown are meant to give the reader an idea of the multi-faceted nature of the chemical arsenal which the Soviets might be expected to employ.

Code	Trivial Name	Physiol. Class	Persist.	Dissemin. Form	Dosage Type: Symptoms	LD_{50} Inhalation mg-min/m³	Odor/Remarks
AC	Prussic Acid Hydrogen Cyanide	Blood	NP	Vapor	**Lethal:** Convulsions, asphyxia	5000	Bitter almonds/ common Soviet agent
CG	Phosgene	Choking	NP	Gas	**Lethal:** Coughing, foaming at mouth, asphyxia	3200	New mown hay/80% of WWI gas fatalities
HD	Distilled mustard	Blister	P	Vapor, liquid	**Harassing:** Eyes inflamed, ulceration, blindness **Skin:** Redness, blisters **Lethal:** Similar to phosgene in action on lungs	1000	Garlic/Action similar to all H-series and Lewisite (L)
GA	Tabun	Nerve	NP	Vapor, liquid aerosol	Symptons begin from inhalation from moment of exposure to up to 10	150	
GB	Sarin	Nerve	NP	Vapor,liquid	minutes later; for skin absorption from a few minutes up to ½ hours	70	
GD	Soman	Nerve	P	Vapor, liquid aerosol	**Harassing:** Eye pupils constrict, vision blurs	70	Fruity/resistant to oxime therapy, Soviet use thickened form
GP	CMPF	Nerve	?	Liquid, vapor, aerosol	**Respiration:** Difficulty in breathing chest tightness	?	New agent
VX	—	Nerve	P	Liquid, aerosol	**Lethal:** Drooling, sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, spasms, convulsions, coma, asphyxia	?	V-agent in US and Soviet arsenals
CX	Phosgene Oxime	Blister	P	Liquid	**Skin:** Destroys skin tissue completely	High	Irritating/Soviet agent
CK	Cyanagen Chloride	Blood	NP	Gas, vapor	**Lethal:** convulsions, gasping, choking	11,000	Irritating/WWI agent
CN	CAP	Tear	NP	Aerosol	**Harassing: on skin, tears**	8500	Apple blossoms
CS	OCMB	Tear	Varies	Aerosol	**Harassing:** Burning on skin, tears, may cause nausea	Very high	Peppery/Favorites of Chicago PD
DM	Adamsite	Vomiting	NP	Aerosol	**Harassing:** Headache, sneezing, cough, nausea	30,000	Little smell/Soviets have stockpiles
BZ	'Buzz'	Incapacitating	NP	Aerosol	**Incapacitating:** Hallucinations, giddiness, side effect of disoriented psychotic behavior	High	Now non-standard

General Note: Parathion, a comparatively common pesticide, has LD_{50} of 8: Malathion, another pesticide available to gardeners, has an LD_{50} of 15000. The LD_{50} of pure nicotine is 60.

the timely discovery of them by intelligence. Intelligence has the mission of establishing the places of disposition of means of nuclear attack, discovering the system for controlling them, disclosing warehouses for nuclear ammunition and points for their assembly, and checking on their destruction. Special trustworthiness and accuracy are required of intelligence data on means of nuclear attack.[7]

Emphasizing the urgency involved in the detection and destruction of nuclear means, Sidorenko states that "a delay in the destruction of means of nuclear attack will permit the enemy to launch the nuclear strikes first and may lead to heavy losses and even to the defeat the offensive." Consequently, he concludes that these means must be immediately destroyed "wherever they may be—in assembly areas, on the march (when moving out and displacing), and at firing and launch positions."[8]

Reconnaissance is considered by the Soviets to be the main method for the early location of NATO TNW. According to Sidorenko, all means of nuclear attack have their own "reconnaissance signs" which serve as indicators of their location.[9] These are:

1. The presence (in the firing area or close to it) of camouflaged guns, launchers, and missiles.
2. A large number of special-purpose vehicles, vehicles of various types, prime movers, and trailers.
3. The preparation and disposition of firing positions at a distance of 4-12 km from the FEBA.
4. The presence of approach routes to the firing positions.
5. A large number of radios and the special character of their operation.

Approaching this problem from the U.S. side, there are constraints from U.S. freedom of action to deal with Soviet TNW systems which do not restrict the Soviets. For example the current U.S./NATO doctrine is against the appropriate use of TNW against Soviet TNW before they can be launched. Soviet doctrine advocates such preemption at the outset of the war and is vital to the success of their offensive.[10] (Barring a radical reorientation of NATO doctrine, this will be an evil that the MI officer will have to accept.)

Another example of an inherent limitation upon the efforts of MI in locating Soviet TNW is the difficulty involved in intercepting and locating the radars associated with their use. The meteorological data gathered by these radars has to be transmitted to the firing batteries by radio. The intelligence officer should be able to use his available direction finding assets with radio intercept assets to gain a rough idea of the probable location of Soviet TNW positions. Aerial reconnaissance assets should be used to verify the exact location of Soviet TNW. Meanwhile air and/or artillery assets are placed on call to quickly neutralize them. Both suspected as well as confirmed TNW positions must be attacked without delay. This only increases the danger that they would be fired first. Sidorenko argues this point by stating "the accumulation of such targets as nuclear weapons and waiting with the intention of destroying them subsequently is now absolutely inadmissible. Each rocket launcher and each artillery piece capable of employing nuclear ammunition will be destroyed immediately after its detection to prevent them from launching nuclear strikes.[11]

The possibility exists that the Soviets might initiate the use of their TNW from the outset of the war. The MI officer must consider measures designed to prevent Soviet acquisition of information regarding the disposition of U.S. forces, especially the location of our TNW assets. This implies that we would have sufficient warning time to move the majority of our TNW ammunition from their unhardened storage sites, the locations of which are not secret to the Soviets. Most of these measures would come under the heading of operations security. For example a deception operation using false messages and dummy positions to confuse Soviet reconnaissance as to the actual disposition of TNW assets.[12]

MI and the Offensive Use of TNW

Since NATO forces will be on the strategic defensive, the role of counterattacks and limited counteroffensive actions involving the use of TNW by NATO should not be ignored. It is possible that NATO would employ TNW in a counteroffensive or interdiction role within a few hours after the onset of hostilities. As in the case of defense against Soviet TNW, the role of the MI officer again becomes decisive. The location and destruction of Soviet TNW is still top priority, except to prevent their use in the form of nuclear counterstrikes against a U.S./NATO counteroffensive. The next priority would be the suppression and disruption of enemy communications. This is done with a combination of jamming and judicious employment of nuclear bursts so that the electromagnetic pulse effects against Soviet communications and noncommunications emitters would be maximized. Since there will be adequate emitters on both sides in future conflict, the primary task of the intelligence officer will be to locate the greatest concentrations and most critical types of emitters.

Finally, the MI officer will locate the more "conventional" type targets, such as troop concentrations and artillery dispositions. The indication for both

offensive and defensive operations is the collection, processing, and dissemination of critical intelligence. The ability to survive on a nuclear battlefield, will depend upon the capability of intelligence analysts to think fast, evaluate swiftly, and act without hesitation to keep the commander informed.

The Impact of Chemical Munitions

The use of varying degrees of chemical agents has a longer history in warfare, therefore, its effectiveness can be easily documented. Probably the most spectacular initial use of chemical munitions was at the battle of Ypres on the Western Front in April, 1915. Intending as a "field test" of their chlorine gas, the Germans were unprepared for their success when the gas attack resulted in 15,000 Allied casualties and an 8 km hole in the Allied lines. Otherwise the Germans would have broken through the channel ports.[13] Although the Allies substituted defensive countermeasures, the results of this massive use of lethal chemical munitions was in the disaster by being unprepared for an enemy's use of chemical weapons.

There are those who contend that the Soviets will not use chemical weapons in the event of hostilities being initiated against NATO. The main arguments are:

1. The wind will generally be blowing against the desired direction of a Soviet chemical attack.
2. The Soviets desire to fight a war at a high tempo; the use of CW will slow down the offensive in a manner similar to World War I.
3. Use of CW invites a nuclear response by NATO.

There are strong counter-arguments to these three contentions. In answer to the first argument, as long as the wind is not too strong (in excess of 3-5 km/hr), it does not really matter which way the wind is blowing if the attacker is well equipped with chemical defensive clothing and is riding in vehicles designed with air filtration systems. Secondly, the argument that the use of CW will slow down the pace of operations similar to World War I is somewhat out of context. Mustard gas is a persistent delayed-action agent. Coupled with the fact that World War I armies were "straight-leg" infantry, it is not difficult to understand that operations would be slow-paced in any event, regardless of whether or not chemical munitions were used. According to a recent author in **Strategy and Tactics** magazine, "we have a situation where AC blood gas (a nonpersistent agent—JSL) delivered by multiple rocket launchers is only slightly faster than the mechanized assault which follows it."[14]

As far as the Soviets inviting a NATO nuclear response by the use of CW, that is something the Soviets would do by crossing the border. As mentioned previously, Soviet operational doctrine stresses the decisiveness of nuclear weapons, particularly for the side that uses them first. If the Soviets decided to initiate the use of TNW from the outset of a conflict, they would not be deterred from employing CW by the threat of a NATO nuclear response.

Although chemical weapons seem less "spectacular" than TNW as a battlefield threat, they are just as deadly against troops inadequately trained for operations in a chemical environment. Even well-trained troops who are prepared for chemical attack are expected to take a low level of casualties due to the surprise factor alone. On the other hand . . . ***how about troops with mediocre training, whose protective garments are still on some deuce and a half, whose filters were only checked before the AGI (and then by a sergeant whose other duties include drug and alcohol reports, RREO reports, field sanitation, and beer runs for the first sergeant), whose unit decon teams began training a week before the AGI and stopped the day after, and whose own hair is too long for him to get an adequate seal on his protective mask? Fatality estimates for a unit of this Army, even in well-dug foxholes but down wind from two batteries firing nerve agent, could run as high as 50 percent, with casualties in the 60-70 percent bracket.***[15]

MI and Defense Against CW

It is possible the U.S. might use CW in an offensive or retaliatory mode. A prolonged conflict in Europe would allow the U.S. time for production and introduction of its own CW.

FM 30-102, **Opposing Forces Europe,** lists the likely targets for the use of nonpersistent agents by Soviet forces.[16] These are:

1. Defiles, river crossings and communication centers on main axis of attack.
2. Airfields and drop or landing zones prior to airborne assault.
3. U.S. positions close to opposing forces troopos.

Likely targets for the use of persistent agent include:[17]

1. Ground on which the enemy desired to restrict movement.
2. Airfield which the opposing forces do not wish to use in the near future.
3. Ports, bases, and rear area installations.

The following targets may be attacked with either persistent or nonpersistent agents:[18]

1. Nuclear weapons systems and artillery.
2. Well dug-in U.S. positions.
3. Headquarters, reserves, and assembly areas.
4. Along the flight path of an airborne assault.

It is anticipated the Soviets will use their CW in four ways:[19]

1. Long-range bombardment with

persistent nerve agents such as GD or VX designed to contaminate airfields, supply depots, and assembly areas of REFORGER units arriving from the U.S. These agents would be delivered by aircraft spray and/or bomb, or a high-burst SCUD-B warhead.
2. Persistent agents (GD, VX, HD) along the flanks of fast-moving armored columns. These agents would probably be delivered by tube and rocket artillery.
3. Harassing fires with a combination of various agents designed to disrupt NATO command and control and force friendly troops into maintaining a higher level of mission-oriented protective posture.
4. Direct assault with nonpersistent agents such as the highly volatile AC blood agent, possibly used in combination with DM vomiting agent in order to degrade the protective capacity of the mask. The most likely delivery system for this particular use would be the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher.

To be fully effective, chemical munitions are used in much larger numbers than nuclear weapons. This makes the task of locating such weapons not as difficult as would be the case for TNW. CW employment would be recognized by the various transporters of Soviet CW systems into an area accompanied by decontamination vehicles such as the TMS-65, and chemical reconnaissance vehicles like the BRDM-rkh. Aerial reconnaissance would become the primary means of early detection and targeting of Soviet CW.

The purpose of MI conducting an effective defense against the possible Soviet use of CW consists of the early location of actual and suspected CW firing positions. This is based on the location of their prime movers and the presence of chemical defense equipment with them. Rapid, accurate analysis and timely dissemination of intelligence information concerning the location of Soviet CW assets to the commander will be at a very high premium, as with TNW. Often the MI analyst may have to target suspected positions if there seems to be insufficient time to confirm their existence or location.

Conclusion

The role of MI in the attainment of victory on the projected nuclear/chemical battlefield in Europe will be as important as any of the combat arms. Given the decisive potential of TNW and chemical munitions in the determination of victory or defeat, the S-2 at all levels will be concerned with the rapid location and timely preemptive targeting for destruction of Soviet TNW and CW delivery systems. The nuclear/chemical capability of our potential Soviet adversary should inspire a healthy fear in the minds of every soldier. It will be a good thing if it does. In the words of General William Tecumseh Sherman, "Fear is the beginning of wisdom."

Footnotes

1. A.A. Sidorenko, **The Offensive** (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatelstvo, 1970. Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force), p. 40.
2. V.Ye. Savkin, **The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics** (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatelstvo, 1972. Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force), p. 191.
3. Sidorenko, **The Offensive**, p. 61.
4. Ibid., p. 59.
5. Ibid., pp. 57-64, passim.
6. Savkin, **The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics**, pp. 172-173.
7. Sidorenko, **The Offensive**, p. 135.
8. Ibid., p. 134.
9. Ibid., p. 135.
10. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., **The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive** (Washington, D.C.: published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1975), p. 72.
11. Sidorenko, **The Offensive**, p. 134.
12. T.C. Mataxis and S.L. Goldberg, **Nuclear Tactics** (Harrisburg Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 94-98.
13. Austin Bay, "Chemical Warfare: Perspectives and Potentials," **Strategy and Tactics**, No. 81, July-August 1980, pp. 24-25.
14. Ibid., p. 27.
15. Ibid., p. 27. Soviet defensive capabilities, however, are quite substantial. See **Strategy and Tactics** No. 79, March-April 1980, p. 23.
16. Ibid., p. 28.
17. FM-30-102, **Opposing Forces Europe**, p. 14-35.
18. Ibid., p. 14-36
19. Ibid.

Capt. Jonathan S. Lockwood is currently assigned as an Action Officer in Studies and Analysis Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAICS. He received his commission in the USAR from the University of Tampa in 1977, where he was graduated with a BA in History and Psychology. He earned his MA in International Affairs from the University of Miami in 1978, and the PhD in 1980. His is the author of ***The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decision Making*** to be published this fall by Transaction Press, and is also the author of a forthcoming monograph entitled ***Space, Time, and Force: the Theory of Nuclear Combat***. He is a graduate of the MIOB and 35A courses.

A Cheap War

by 1LT Richard M. Etnyre

The Soviets had moved swiftly. Intelligence had been reporting the build-up for about two weeks before the first Soviet units crossed the border. The outposts had been devastated by the first echelon. The sudden silence on the radio told the story all to well. Major power and communication lines had been cut. Even the alert sirens had been sabotaged.

The operations center made apparent what a massive operation this was. Battalion commanders and their staffs huddled around map boards scrutinizing every inch of land. The 1st Cavalry Division was getting ready to defend against the Soviet's first echelon.

This was not a real war, but a simulation designed to depict the massive command and control, administrative and logistical problems a division could face in combat. The purpose of simulation is to provide a realistic vehicle to act as a training aid for the command and staff functions. In a period when budgets are being scrutinized and training areas are in increasing demand, these games have become effective training tools.

A division or corps level CPX is designed to tax the command, staff and logistical functions of division or corps level assets. This is accomplished by battalion staffs manuevering counters (representing company size elements) on a 1:50,000 scale map against Soviet counters on another map board. Unit moves are recorded on manuever sheets and turned over to a controller. The controller goes to the opposing force map board, determines at what point contact is made and with what size force. Then die are thrown, charts refered to, and casualties and equipment losses assessed. The game is better known as "First Battle."

The game provides an excellent opportunity to exercise the tactical intelligence community. It is a vehicle for intelligence officers to use and demonstrate their knowledge of Soviet operations, and requires commanders, operations officers and intelligence officers at all levels to interface as they should. This helps strengthen and reinforce the importance of an equal relationship between the S3 and S2.

The majority of officers in the 1st Cavalry Division are lieutenants dealing with counterparts who are experienced majors. The S2 not only demonstrates expertise in intelligence, but also learns tactics from an officer with more experience. Intelligence personnel are used at all levels in the simulations.

The battalion S2 on the playing board acts as a training aid for brigade and above. His mission is to generate information and report activities/results for three to five separate battalions, depending on the size of the brigade. To accomplish this mission, the S2 must understand his unit's scheme of manuever and know the enemy forces' intentions. By taking the movement results prepared by the controller and analyzing them, the S2 can tell where companies made contact and what losses resulted. This data conversion of hard and soft target losses is made with spot reports of combat loss of T-62, T-72, BMPs and jeeps. The more creative the S2, the more realistic the problem becomes for brigade and division. The battalion S2 must prepare the pigment for the brigade S2 to paint the picture.

Usually the brigade is fully tactical. Only the Texas scrub trees and cattle remind the staff that they are not in Europe. There is no set scenario, no incident list or master event schedule, so the commander's intelligence is only as good as the S2. The brigade S2 goes through all the intelligence preparation of the battlefield before the game starts so the intelligence information will be on hand before the game begins. Once again the intelligence officer and intelligence analyst (96B) are faced with a final exam. This is only a pre-exam, however. The final will be their proficiency in the next conflict.

The brigade intelligence officer is inundated with information in these exercises, as can be expected in combat. From a tactical field location, he attempts to manage the information from the battalion while sending and receiving reports. This information management is crucial. On-the-spot decisions must be made as to what is intelligence and what's not relevant. The success of the operation often depends on this analysis.

Division and/or corps also usually move out with the scrub brush and jack rabbits, but once inside the operations center it feels and looks like Europe. The All Source Intelligence Center and the Divisional Tactical Operation Center are operational, attempting to find and predict the enemy's next move. The majority of the tactical intelligence assets are managed at this level. Guardrail, quicklook, quickfix, TLQs, MLQs and GLQs are all tasked to meet the commander's essential elements of information or other elements of information needs. Intelligence experts must analyze and identify the second echelon in time for the commander to commit his reserve in the right place and time to stop the enemy penetration. (Continued on page 60)

A Critical Look at OPSEC—REFORGER 81

by CW3 David E. Mann

It is understandable that regardless of doctrine published, every military organization has its own methods of employment of that doctrine. OPSEC is certainly no exception. The 8th Infantry Division (Mech), the largest U.S. Army division, participated in FTX CERTAIN ENCOUNTER, a major REFORGER 81 exercise. Some valuable lessons were learned about utilization of OPSEC personnel during the FTX. Not following the basic guidance caused some problems to surface during the FTX and those operational disconnects were tough teachers for personnel performing OPSEC. Lack of adherence to doctrine hindered employment of MI Battalion OPSEC assets and management of an all-source OPSEC operation.

The March 1981 organization of the 108th MI Bn (CEWI) prompted a complete review of the role of OPSEC Management and Analysis (OMA) by the G2, 8ID(M). Prior to the 108th MI Bn (CEWI) being organized, 4 CI Field Offices, and a CI Operations Division at G2 provided CI support for the division. Direction, management, ratings, and operational control was a vertical arrangement, from the Chief, CI Division to the Field Offices. There was minimal production of OPSEC for "Customers" such as Brigade S3's and other subordinate units. The local ASA company provided SIGINT support to the division, but with no interface with the CI Division for OPSEC purposes. The SIGSEC assets were assigned to the CI Division Chief under his "second hat" as Chief, SIGSEC. Practically speaking, there was no SIGSEC done for OPSEC purposes. Although SIGSEC missions were carried out, the reporting was kept "behind the green door" and not integrated into a useful OPSEC product. There were a few "OPSEC Survey Reports" rendered by the CI Division. Those reports were well-received by commanders, but were in reality CI Surveys with an OPSEC title affixed.



Following activation of the 108th MI Bn (CEWI), the G2 staff began to address the employment of OPSEC Management and Analysis. The magnitude of a major exercise as REFORGER demanded that the 8ID(M) obtain a firm grip on OPSEC assets. FTX CERTAIN ENCOUNTER set the stage for some innovative planning, but the questions raised by TRADOC on OPSEC concerning deployment and utilization of the OMA section was not fully answered. Portions of the test were successful; other areas failed to achieve those goals set in ARTEP guidance.

TRADOC describes the OPSEC Management and Analysis function as follows:

> OPSEC Management and Analysis personnel are the planners and managers for OPSEC. They get threat data from intelligence sections and CEWI Operations Centers, and compare it with friendly signatures, patterns, and profiles, to identify vulnerabilities. OMA Sections also recommend deception and other appropriate countermeasures.[1]





TRADOC PAM 525-6 provides some specific tasks for the OPSEC Team:

- Assist in developing EEFI.
- Develop and maintain a data base on friendly signatures, pattern, and profiles.
- Develop indicators which affect or may compromise EEFI.
- Analyze and evaluate OPSEC reports and recommend countermeasures.
- Monitor friendly operations and recommend countermeasures and corrective procedures.
- Prepare OPSEC estimate and plans.
- Request, from intelligence sections, information needed to develop enemy intelligence collection threat.
- Help develop an OPSEC training plan.
- Prepare OPSEC portion of the field operation procedure.
- Assist with deception planning, monitor and analyze the effects of deception operations.
- Coordinate SIGSEC and ECCM activities with the CE officer and the EW section.
- Develop tasking and priorities for OPSEC support elements and teams.[2]

These guidelines, plus instructions from the various ARTEP publications for the Headquarters and Operations Company, CEWI Battalion, were examined as part of the planning for the OMA mission. Unfortunately, many of the goals set forth in the literature were not accomplished. Exercise of this doctrine would have improved the overall OPSEC posture of the division; however, as every commander knows, you always learn something new during an exercise. Learning is one of the most important reasons we train in a field environment.

The following were some major points about OMA's operations during the FTX. They were extracted from the OMA duty log and the battle book and were compared with the available doctrine, particularly TRADOC Pamphlet 525-6.

1. OPSEC at the 8ID(M) is OPCON to the G2, instead of the G3. Although some informal discussions were held between the OMA section and the G3 plans shop prior to the FTX, nothing more was heard from the G3 during or after the FTX. OPSEC personnel were not invited to participate in battle planning, troop movements, river crossings, or deception plans. OMA was not wholly aware of those plans until after their execution. This lack of coordination was observed by the author throughout the FTX as well as during the prior planning stages. Although it is not known for certain, many operations were surmised to have taken place without any OPSEC considerations applied to them. The excuse that "we were not invited" has a weak sound to it; OPSEC personnel are learning that they must be more aggressive in selling the OPSEC product to the local combat arms. The underlying problem with lack of participation in

planning, however, appears to be the fact that there is no OPSEC responsibility under the control of the G3. Having OPSEC functions under the G2 does not enhance accomplishment of the doctrinal OPSEC mission. It is too easy to view OPSEC personnel as a garrison asset which can process security clearances, DTOC access passes, do personnel security files maintenance, and control security investigations done by the CI field offices. Thus, there remains little time for OPSEC planning. The present TRADOC guidance that OPSEC should be a G3 function is there for a purpose: There is constant coordination required for all planning. OPSEC must be integrated into all plans and operations; this must be done by having an OPSEC team study every plan, every operations order, and every requirement, before it leaves the G3 plans shop.

2. The OMA section was located as the Exercise Support Center, some distance away from the DTOC. The DTOC OPSEC support team was co-located with the DTOC. Threats which were received by the DTOC team were usually briefed as received to the G2 Operations Officer. This meant a high visibility for OPSEC information which virtually guaranteed instant attention to OPSEC problems. Whether those problems were acted upon is not completely known as there was little feedback from high echelons back to OMA. The Chief, OMA DTOC Support Team, a CI Assistant, and some SIGSEC analysis assets were located at the DTOC. The Chief OMA was located at the exercise support center and was in constant contact with PMO, G5, Maneuver Damage Control, and the local national police teams. This planned-for function operated well except for communications. It was difficult to receive and send timely OPSEC information through this channel and the OMA DTOC support team found S2 officers and liaison personnel contacting them directly for OPSEC updates rather than driving to the Exercise Support Center.
3. Brigade S2's and their NCOs made regular visits to the DTOC OMA team during times when they were in the area. The OMA section welcomed those visits, briefed, provided OPSEC information, a hot cup of coffee, and generally made the visitors feel welcome. This served two purposes: First it enabled OMA to rapidly pass on information without it being garbled in the inevitably fouled-up communications system, and it provided a positive psychological setting for OMA to present their product. Intentionally, there were now actions taken by OMA to make a unit or S2 look bad, catch that unit in a security violation, or otherwise give the appearance of being an element of some mythical "OPSEC Police."
4. OPSEC teams at brigade level, DIVARTY and DISCOM, were nonexistent, because the local policy of placement of SIGSEC teams and CI personnel under the central control of the G2. This meant that brigade S2's lacked the local analysis function they needed and were dependent upon periodic, but frequently untimely, OPSEC reports via an unreliable FM secure net. This also meant that even if brigade personnel had the time to collect friendly OPSEC information, they did not have the assets to do anything with the information other than to forward it higher. The decision not to place SIGSEC, CI and OPSEC assets at brigade level is an area of frequent and fierce contention. Some staff officers opine that brigade S2's or S3's view OPSEC (including CI and SIGSEC) assets as either a manpower and spare equipment pool, or a hindrance. Some brigade commanders have supposedly said, "If it doesn't shoot and kill, I don't want it on my battlefield." There have been other comments that the brigade officers would misuse the SIGSEC, CI, and OPSEC assets, putting them in the spare personnel pool for use as guards and mess attendants so as to be able to comandeer their vehicles for personal use. It is difficult to believe that this situation would occur. Commanders always appreciate information which will help them kill the enemy or keep their troops from being killed.
5. Although OPSEC monitoring of friendly operations in progress was attempted, lack of a combat arms officer or senior NCO at OMA was a problem. A combat arms person could have worked with the G3 staff for OPSEC planning purposes. As it actually occurred during the FTX, this lack of a combat arms officer relegated the DTOC OPSEC OIC to the role of an outside observer without sufficient knowledge of battle planning. This problem area would be obviated by having a viable OPSEC staff assigned to the G3 on a full-time basis.

6. The DTOC OMA Section received numerous reports from CI Operations at the Exercise Support Center, because of the co-location of the Chief, OMA with the center. However, EEI were neither sent nor received from LRRP elements, aviation scouts, or other collection assets. Some key activities were not observed or reported on by OPSEC, including river crossings, pontoon bridge operations, and deceptions. Rear area protection reports received pertained to real world threats such as terrorists and civilian demonstrations; exercise RAP reports were nonexistent.
7. OPSEC communications were entirely wire-dependent. Although planned for in advance, telephones were not installed and it was necessary to have OMA personnel string their own point-to-point TA-312 telephone to the G2 Operations element in the DTOC. Numerous telephone outages and lack of a radio caused OMA to fall back on vehicle courier runs and the local German telephone system. Timely contact with the centrally located SIGSEC element was never possible, again because of lack of communications. Radios were not available since they are not authorized by TOE. Real-world threat information such as national level intelligence information as received by means of the SSO circuit. Spot reports on Soviet Military Liaison Mission sightings, and other vulnerabilities, were passed in spot report form but were not usually timely because of delayed delivery.
8. IMINT collection for OPSEC purposes was nonexistent. The controlling Corps G2 personnel had issued guidance that IMINT collection for OPSEC was to be requested, inexplicably, through CI channels. When communication was finally available to Corps players



tasking was passed but no results of missions flown were received by ENDEX. In comparison, the local air Recce personnel took the initiative and tasked IMINT assets for OPSEC purposes. It was obvious from this fiasco that the IMINT tasking and collection system was present but somewhere the idea of OPSEC IMINT being the same as any other type of IMINT was lost.

9. Ground-level, hand-held photography emphasized that one picture is worth a thousand words. 97B10 CI Assistants were used to collect nighttime, time lapse photography of the DTOC areas. This procedure used a common instant picture camera with ASA 3000 Black and White film packs, and discovered light leaks, poorly camouflaged positions, microwave antennas outlined above the tree levels, and the light trails of personnel using flashlights without red filters.
10. The same 97B10's received valuable training as part of a CI reaction time, located with the DTOC. While CI exercise play was not written into the FTX scenario, CI personnel were used to investigate several real-world sabotage acts and lost classified document cases, make unclassified trash studies, and perform security surveys of VIP lodging areas. CI Assistants were also employed in two joint MP-CI operations to attempt capture of opposing forces unconventional warfare listening post personnel.
11. SIGSEC personnel provided more than 510 hours coverage during the 14-day exercise, intercepting 10,592 transmissions. When not enough SIGSEC-peculiar receivers were available, 05G personnel used AN/PRC-77 radios with whip antennas. The most pressing need discovered was a means or real-time communications between the SIGSEC team and the OPSEC managers so that spot reports could have been reported in a timely manner. Also needed were more 05G NCOs. Ideally, each team of 05G operators would have an NCO assigned to supervise, conduct quality control checks, and manage coverage of targets by the team. All of this was done by one E6 and one E5, the rest of the 05G personnel being newly arrived from school.
12. OMA received a large amount of very timely and accurate threat reports pertaining to the activities of suspected opposing force unconventional warfare teams operating in the division's rear. CI teams, made up of personnel from the three CI Field Offices, operated with rental cars and in civilian clothes, and mounted a very successful CI Special Operation against those UW forces. Several IPW linguists accompanied the teams to help overcome the language barrier. However, lack of OPSEC caused this otherwise successful special operation to end after discovery and capture. Valuable intelligence was lost for the remainder of the exercise.
13. At times, antiquated equipment and ill-conceived TOE structures frustrated the efforts of OMA. As a case in point, the AN/TYK-10A, a SIGSEC data transcription van, could only be used as a typing position until its electric panels burned out for the final time. This was because tape transcription of SIGSEC information was not done nor desired by OMA. The AN/TYK-10A is designed to play back tape recordings of SIGSEC monitoring made by the outlying SIGSEC Teams. Presumably, SIGSEC analyst personnel assigned to OMA would listen to the tapes and produce a periodic analytic report. This concept is neither feasible nor required for several reasons: First, OMA must be able to retrieve the tapes from the teams, which it cannot do in a timely manner because of lack of physical contact with outlying SIGSEC teams. Second, SIGSEC personnel do not routinely make tape recordings of monitored radio traffic at the 8ID(M) since upwards of 50 man-hours per day of traffic is intercepted and inordinate amounts of reel-to-reel tape would be required. Transmissions are monitored and typed directly onto multi-part teletype paper by the operators. These transcriptions are used later to provide statistics, types of discrepancies, and to double-check operator proficiency. Third, tapes must be retained in SIGSEC control channels per regulation, since they would provide the identity of personnel monitored. Use of actual or identifiable transcripts for OPSEC purposes is not permitted or required. OMA needed only two short and concise messages from the SIGSEC Team Chief: Spot reports, such as "1/59 AR just comprised their refuel point," and statistics such as number of hours monitored and the discrepancy rate.

To conclude the preceding comments about problems, the author feels that readers must understand that they are descriptive of only one OMA section dur-





ing one FTX. Lessons learned are always painful and, when written down, sound as if the writer is attacking a particular section or group of personnel rather than the system or the doctrine. In this case, the most valuable lesson learned was that it is very difficult to overcome years of past inertia and abruptly change operational stride and direction. During FTX CERTAIN ENCOUNTER some very significant efforts were made in sorting out who were the players, where they should act out their parts, and areas in which more rehearsals were required. Commanders and their staff had to learn to receive and process a previously nonexistent product. In the future, they need to press their commanders for more integration of that data into operations planning and execution. OPSEC personnel have to recognize the need for timely, consistent reporting, and for the aggressive integration of their activities into the initial stages of plans and operations. What follows are recommendations for producing a more effective OPSEC operation in the field. Changes are recommended that are on track with the appropriate TOE, but which do not follow present doctrine in some divisions. The time has arrived to re-examine OPSEC and the employment of OPSEC personnel and their equipment, with the requirement that operations follow published TRADOC guidance.

Communications between the various OPSEC teams on a real-time basis is important, but not critically important if each brigade has its own OPSEC team. There should be a continuing dialogue between the brigade OPSEC teams and the OMA section at G3. Communications between the CI teams and OPSEC teams located at brigade can take place using the existing radio set that is assigned to the team.

IMINT collection is IMINT, whether for OPSEC, G2, or the Engineers. Tasking for IMINT should be made through G2 Collection Management, which is responsible for getting air missions flown. CI personnel should not burden the system with another ad hoc channel for IMINT requirements.

OPSEC must be placed under the supervision of the G3. The Chief, OMA, should be rated by the G3 Deputy for Plans and have a senior rating by the G3. The OMA

Section, ACS, G3, would continue with its OPSEC duties, use its assigned TOE equipment and personnel, but would perform OPSEC duties as an integral part of the G3 staff. Personnel assigned to OMA would no longer be responsible for G2 business such as personnel security investigation requests, and processing accessing passes for the DTOC. OPSEC personnel are not assigned to perform unit security manager housekeeping functions; they are present for OPSEC duty. In a practical sense, of course, this would mean that the G2 would have to come up with the personnel to support the garrison security manager duties required. It would also mean that OPSEC personnel would have the time to do OPSEC—their assigned mission—rather than a personnel security mission which is part of OPSEC but not all of OPSEC.

The next requirement is the return of control over OPSEC elements to the Brigade S3 officer. As can be readily seen, this gives the Brigade commander at least 6 or 8 additional personnel to do SIGSEC, OPSEC, CI, and who can report directly to the brigade S3 with real-time information. An OPSEC team is supposed to be at the brigade TOC (at least according to TRADOC), issuing SIGSEC spot reports, doing limited tactical CI activities, and maintaining a limited OPSEC research and analysis system prior to and during the battle. For example, a SIGSEC spot report needs only to be handed from the OMA team to the S3 at brigade TOC level, rather than fight itself through several layers of command losing the timeliness of reporting in the process. The same rationale applies across the board to CI and other OPSEC activities at brigade.

Next on the agenda is the development of an operating procedure for employment of the OPSEC team at brigade, DISCOM and DIVARTY. For example, it is obvious that an ELSEC team needs to be deployed with DIVARTY, and extra CI assets assigned to DISCOM to cover the DISCOM POW recovery cage. The ARTY also needs radio monitor team support. In any event, a well-developed operating procedure would sort out which unit needs which asset and configure those teams to effectively interface with the particular mission of the support unit. The personnel would belong to the S3 at brigade level, and thus the S3 would be answerable for their effective employment. That type of oversight control would effectively quiet any "war stories" about putting 97B's or 05G's on permanent KP and commandeering their M151's to make PX runs in from the field.

The development of EEFI, OPSEC data bases, signature and pattern analysis, would be carried out by the OMA section and G3 level with continuous contact between them and the brigade teams. Evaluation of OPSEC products produced by the brigades could be accomplished by the simple expedient of sending a copy of each report to the OMA section at G3 for review and recording it into an integrated division OPSEC data base. The remainder of OPSEC tasks recommended by TRADOC PAM 525-6 fall into place both at the brigade level and at division because of the use of an "OPSEC higher to OPSEC lower" exchange of information. The use of a $2,500 microcomputer dedicated to OPSEC to $150 worth of off-the-shelf software can send and receive data over the PCM or VHF multichannel telephone system, which is secure. Matching microcomputers at the brigade teams send and receive to "OPSEC higher" via telephone coupling modems also available off-the-shelf for $100.



The SIGSEC mission is essential for production of an OPSEC data base and for timely spot reporting. Also, if the SIGSEC team makes tape recordings of radio transmissions, those tape recordings can later be transcribed and used for deception purposes by playback or by having script readers transmit the information from previously agreed upon locations. SIGSEC teams at brigade and separate units such as cavalry, deception forces, and DISCOM depots, should be able to give real-time feedback on SIGSEC posture to the local commander and his staff. The SIGSEC NCOIC must be given sufficient latitude in his or her operational control in order to obtain a comprehensive evaluation of the monitored unit's communications profile. To be continuously monitoring one or two nets, neglecting others, presents a skewed picture of a unit's SIGSEC posture. Some of the most vulnerable nets include the so-called administrative nets, admin and log, the MP's, refuel and resupply convoys. All of these nets must be monitored at periodic intervals during alerts, pre-move out coordination tests, readiness exercises, and during war. An axiom which the author prefers to use as read in a logistics publication, "it is better to lose one tank by enemy action than a GOER capable of supplying three tanks."

The equipment situation, namely the AN/TYK-10A, must be corrected by innovative in-house modification. The AN/TYK-10A is a prime example of



antiquated equipment, built for old ASA units, present for duty because no replacement exists. It is issued for mounting on either an M880 truck or a Gamma Goat, with a 5KW generator trailer. The first corrective measure is to get rid of the generator set, which is noisy, fuel hungry, and which produces a distinctive aural signature. Taking a critical look at the power budget of the "Tick Ten" reveals that power requirements can be handled by a 1.5KW generator set if the heating and/or air conditioning is not used. Co-location of the AN/TYK-10A with brigade or division headquarters enables it to be tied to the TOC's larger generators and eliminates the requirement for one more noisy gas guzzling generator in the TOC area. Reconfiguration of the TYK-10A enclosure into an OPSEC analysis working position gives room for 3 people, two typewriters, a lighted map board, and a microcomputer with printer and telephone modem, plus an AN/GRC-46 radio set with AC supply. The unused tape recorders, rack panels, and other associated equipment for which replacement parts have long been unavailable are to be stored. A cargo trailer must be used for personal gear, tentage, camouflage screens and rations. The present TOE calls for, in addition to the AN/TYK-10A, a 5-ton expandable body truck to be used as an OPSEC analysis and operations facility at the DTOC. There has already been serious talk at some divisions of taking the 5-ton truck away from OPSEC and giving it to the division commander for a personal working van. However, if the present shortage of 5-ton trucks continues, it may be years before the OPSEC managers (or the Division commanders) see the truck.

In conclusion, the author wishes to reinforce the point that sitting and complaining about how fouled up things are never accomplishes anything except promotion of low morale. Commanders and their staffs have a serious responsibility to find weaknesses and apply remedies to those areas. In the case of the 8th Infantry Division (Mech), we have experienced and capable NCOs, Warrant Officers and an understanding Commander; we have all learned many valuable lessons about how to accomplish effective OPSEC. The brigade S3's, DIVARTY and DISCOM need pin-pointed OPSEC assets now. If we wait for directions from the writers of TOE documents, the reviewers of DA policy, the decision-makers at echelons above Corps, we will be guilty of a non-innovative attitude. It is easy to say, "don't rock the boat," but vastly more difficult to use introspection, identify shortcomings, weaknesses, and strengths, and drive on to success.

* * *

Footnotes

1. HQ, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, **Pamphlet 525-6, Operations Security,** 1 May 1981, pp. 33-34.
2. Ibid.
3. HQ, DA, **ARTEP 34-166, HQ, HQ & OPS (TOE 34-166) CEWI BN, DIV,** 29 December 1980.

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(Continued on page 27)

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT:
A Division-level Approach

by Capt. John M. Greene Jr.

INTRODUCTION

The intelligence cycle consists of a four-phase operation involving directing an intelligence collection effort, collecting and processing that information, and disseminating the finished intelligence product. This cycle is continuous and provides information to satisfy the Commander's Essential Elements of Information and Other Intelligence Requirements relative to each division mission. The Collection Management section directs the overall division collection effort for the ACofS, G2, and coordinates directly with other G2 sections to insure the timely receipt, analysis and dissemination of combat intelligence.

With the Collection Management function at the forefront of the intelligence cycle, it is sad that little has been written about the actual "How to" aspect of CM. Col. William Harmon has written two good articles in MI, October-December 1980 issue, which address the philosophy of collection management and the need for a strong CM effort at division level. He emphasizes that CM is the starting point, at division level, for levying requirements on the intelligence system to produce, and that by means of the collection plan, the CM officer can monitor collection activities' responses to existing tasking. While he is strong on the "what to do" and "why to do it" aspects of CM, Col. Harmon does not discuss the "how to do it." This article will focus on the intelligence collection management effort at the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and its practical application for G2 field operations.

Collection Management consists of planning, tasking and, in coordination with the G2 All-Source Production Section, evaluating the division production effort. To accomplish these functions, the section is authorized personnel from the division TOE—for a Tactical Surveillance Office—and the 104th MI Battalion DTOC Support Element—for a CM&D section. The dissemination function, as well as the maintenance of the intelligence communications systems in the field, is performed by an Operations section, also subordinate to the G2. Collection management is located within the secure area of the DTOC, and with G2 Operations, ASPS, and the 104th Technical Control and Analysis Element, operates out of the two expandable G2 vans, backed end-to-end and situated next to the G3 and FSE setup. Because of some of the collection systems available at division and at corps/echelon above corps, and the sensitivity of some of the information collected, all section personnel require access to Special Intelligence.

With the incorporation of the TSO into a consolidated CM section and the inclusion of the 104th TCAE into the G2 field operation, CM is able to manage division or higher collection capabilities in the disciplines of R&S and SIGINT. (Human intelligence at division consists primarily of IPW reports; coordination with adjacent and higher headquarters is necessary to obtain information derived from other human sources).

A TACTICAL SCENARIO

The following example illustrates the "how to" of CM in a tactical environment. Although not exhaustive of all aspects of CM field operations, it does highlight the key elements—the practical application—of the 4th Infantry Division's concept.

It is now 0300 and the G2 has just returned from a briefing with the commanding general. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is in contact with the 2nd OPFOR Tank Division, consisting of the 181st Tank Regiment, 182nd Tank Regiment, 183rd Tank Regiment and the 120th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The 181st, 182nd and 120th have been located and are pressing the attack. The location of the 183rd TR has not been confirmed, although tasking requirements have been levied on the brigades and on Corps to report contact. Because of successful enemy attacks over the past 24 hours, the CG's guidance to the G2 is to locate the 183rd TR and provide an assessment as to whether it will be committed in support of the main attack in the north of the division sector. The main thrust is expected within four hours so the G2 must respond quickly.

The G2 calls one of his periodic coordination meetings, with

representatives from the FSE/ALO, Staff Weather officer, OPSEC Management and Analysis element, ASPS, Operations and CM, to discuss the new requirement. These meetings, which can be called at any time but at a minimum are held at least every three hours, allow for collection priorities to be redefined, and new or amended EEI/OIR to be recommended to the commander. He explains that the commander's priority EEI is now whether the 183rd TR will be committed to the main attack and, if so, will they attack before 0700. The ASPS, through a detailed terrain analysis, templating and the use of the event analysis matrix, has been able to define the greatest area of threat in the division's northern sector and has tentatively located the 183rd in an area where it could be deployed for an attack. With the commander's most recent guidance, they are now able to refine the EEI into indicators of the attack—activation of certain ADA elements, fire support and C^3 nets, movement of columns of troops and vehicles forward through named areas of interest, and location of reconnaissance elements forward, as examples—which can be further translated into specific requests for information keyed to these indicators. These RFIs are then submitted to CM for inclusion into the collection plan.

An example of one of the ASPS' RFIs—to locate ADA elements— See Figure One. Note that each RFI, assigned a number by the requestor, specifies in the greatest possible detail the information desired, a named area or signal of interest, and the requestor's time of latest information utility, or date no longer valid. Normally RFIs do not specify collection systems to be used; that portion will be filled in by the CMO.

The collection plan, the CMO's primary tool for tracking and modifying collection priorities and tasking requests, consists of the commander's EEI/OIR, indicators and index file system of tracking both incoming RFIs and outgoing specific orders and requests (SOR)—the same file, in fact, as that suggested by Col. Harmon. RFIs are submitted by the ASPS, the CMO retains and evaluates them against current collection priorities and capabilities.

It is now 0320 and the CMO's job begins in earnest. Glancing at his air mission status chart, he determines that an ELINT system will be airborne and available to Corps at 0530, and that it can cover the area requested. He knows that Corps requires a two-hour lead time for tasking requests and, therefore, his SOR will be submitted in time. After a quick consultation with the chief of the TCAE, he levies a task on the Collection and Jamming Platoon for location and identification of the ADA Early Warning net and logs in the tasking to both Corps and C&J on the RFI card. He completes his SOR cards to the two collection agencies tasked—Corps and C&J. (The TCAE refines the COMINT collection requirement into collection parameters appropriate to systems available). The SOR will specify the agency, specific

SAMPLE RFI FORMAT

REQUESTOR: ASPS **REQUEST NO:** 11

EEI/INDICATOR: Locate 183rd TR/ADA Elements deployed to support the attack

REQUEST: Locate Regimental Air Defense

NAI (IF KNOWN): NB 2015 - 3026 - 2124 Special ATTN Hwy 268

SOI (IF KNOWN): GUN DISH radar, Div ADA Early Warning Net

DNLV: 090700

AGENCIES TASKED: C&J, Corps

Figure 1



Figure 2

SAMPLE SOR FORMAT

RFI: ASPS II DNLV: 090700

AGENCY: COPRS

REPORT DUE: As obtained; updates hourly.

TASKING/REQUEST: Report presence of GUN DISH radars

NAI: NB 2015 - 3015 - 3026 - 2124 - Special ATTN Hwy 268

SOI: GUN DISH

REMARKS: NONE

Figure 3

information requested, NAI/SOPI (if known), DNLV and the time reporting requirements, and any other remarks necessary for internal logging procedures. One RFI does not necessarily equate to one SOR either; as in our example, more than one request may be formulated to several agencies (Corps and C&J) just to satisfy that one information need. The CMO then monitors responses to SORs to insure timely, multiple-source satisfaction of RFIs.

It is now 0600 and for the past two and one half hours C&J has been unable to locate elements of the regimental ADA. SOTAS, which has been weathered in and has just now received take-off clearance, is enroute to its assigned orbiting point. The first Corps ELINT report comes in at 0605—the location of a ZSU-23-4, in an area which the ASPS had predicted. Quickly the CMO cues SOTAS to the same area and files yet a third SOR. He gives the SOTAS ground OIC a threshold number of movers, which correlates to the ASPS' analysis of numbers of vehicles associated with the probable size of a regimental march column. Within minutes, SOTAS detects vehicular movement and the CMO, through efficient, real-time cueing, has provided mutually confirming data to the All-Source section. The commander's EEI now satisfied, the ASPS now cancels its tasking request and its Targeting Branch notifies the FSE of a confirmed target for air interdiction. By focusing on specific questions of what (indicators), when and where (both determined by doctrine and terrain), and by maintaining and constantly updating the operational status and responsiveness of systems tasked through use of the card filing system and air mission status chart, the most efficient use of limited resources, rapid confirmation of indicators, and reduced flow of irrelevant data has been assured.

It is now 0630 and the G2 has just told the CG of his successful collection and targeting effort. The CG is satisfied that he knows where the enemy is, but he wants to know if the air interdiction damaged the enemy enough to begin a counterattack.

CONCLUSION

As evident from the example above, the 4th Infantry Division's collection planning process incorporates all the steps found in the traditional plan—development of EEI and indicators, formulation of collection tasks, and monitoring of agency responses to that tasking. However, the traditional worksheet is not used and several steps have been added to the format outlined in FM 30-5. As with the traditional plan, the commander recommends the EEI and the ASPS refines these indicators. It also performs the additional task of defining the time or area "window" which that activity must fit into in order to be translated into a specific request for information. Once the ASPS submits an RFI, the CMO examines it for "collection indicators." (In the foregoing example, two "collection indicators" were

STANDARD COLLECTION PLAN

(1) EEI/OIR	(2) INDICATORS	(3) SOR	(4) AGENCY	(5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS	(6) REMARKS
CDR	ASPS	ASPS/ CM	CM	CM	CM

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (M) COLLECTION PLAN

(1) EEI/OIR	(2) INDICATORS	(3) TIME/AREA WINDOW	(4) RFI	(5) COLLECTION INDICATORS	(6) AGENCY	(7) REPORTING RQRMTS	(8) REMARKS
CDR	ASPS (DECISION SPT TEMPLATE PROCESS DRIVES INDICATORS SELECTED.)	ASPS (EVENT ANALYSIS MATRIX KEYS INDICATORS TO SPECIFIC TIME/TERRAIN.)	ASPS (SPECIFIC QUESTION TO BE ASKED.)	CM (SIGINT RECCE, ECT).	CM	CM (THIS DATA MAINTAINED ON CM SOR CARD FILING SYSTEM. SEE FIGURE 3.)	CM

Figure 4

noted—one COMINT, one ELINT—and two collection systems were tasked accordingly). SORs are formulated to available agencies and responses are tracked—not by means of circles and Xs, as in FM 30-5, but by means of the card filing system. The CMO cancels collection requirements when the requestor indicates a satisfactory response has been received.

Admittedly the foregoing illustrates an idealized situation but it describes the 4th Infantry Division's system for collection management, a system that works. After extensive revisions to, and testing of, the concept in two division command post exercises, the system described was successfully implemented last fall on FTX CERTAIN ENCOUNTER (REFORGER '81). It provides a means to more accurately task and track intelligence collection systems in field operations. It also allows for gaps in collection coverage identified by the ASPS to be filled quickly. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it allows the G2 to direct and control the collection, analysis, production and dissemination of combat intelligence for use by all units operating within the division area.

Capt. John M. Greene Jr. spent one year as the G2 Collection Management Officer of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colo. The 4th Infantry deployed in support of REFORGER '81 and Greene used his experiences there as a basis for his article. He is currently serving as chief of the G2 All-Source Production Center. Prior to his current assignment, Greene was stationed at the U.S. Army Field Station Berlin and is a graduate of the MI Officers' Advanced Course. He holds a B.A. from the University of Virginia and an M.P.A. from the University of Oklahoma.

Reforger (Continued from page 23)

in Computer Information Systems program. Military schooling includes the MIWOAC, WOSC, and other courses in the various intelligence disciplines from military and civilian agencies. Mann's hobby is amateur radio digital packet microwave communications using microcomputer interface. He has previously published technical articles in microcomputer and amateur radio publications.

THE CRYPTOCORNER

In this issue we challenge you with a pair of encrypted poems. The first one is a lot easier than the second. The cipher alphabets for both poems are different, but both alphabets use the same keyword in one sequence with standard A through Z order. Good solving!

1. MJGOWZML WZMZGO RMGO FUHIS RMGYM. IVZ KHGL ZV YVURM, FTZ IMDZ VIM EY AVGYM.

2. QAX QBTP FOTHZD OLQ FDPTKX VLAJFE. DOX VBL QATSZMB PLZF ESQX QBFX PBTAJFE.

answer on page 43

THE COUNTERTERRORIST MANDATE

In October 1980, 52 Americans seized the previous November, were still being held hostage in Iran by people calling themselves students. Very little could be learned about these students, who might have been Black (right-wing) or Red (leftist) or both. Whatever their political coloration, they did shock the American people into some sense of what the terror decade (1968-1970) was about. It was mostly about destabilizing the West by extending the classic Von Clausewitz definition of war as the continuation of politics by other means.

—Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*

by Lt. Douglas C. Patt

On 4 December 1981, Executive Order 12333, **United States Intelligence Activities,** was made public. It contained a new mandate for Military Intelligence. Counterintelligence elements were to begin collecting against the personalities and organizations involved in international terrorism. In order to effectively do this, everyone in MI, regardless of speciality, must know who these terrorists are, and what to look for or do when operating against them.

In a paper published annually by the National Foreign Assessment Center of the CIA, **Patterns of International Terrorism,** terrorism was defined as, "The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in opposition to established government authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims."

All good definitions of terrorism share the three, fundamental elements of the CIA version—an act or threat of violence, political in intent, that victimizes often-innocent people other than the targets of the terrorists. It is the separation of target from the victim of the violent act that distinguishes the terrorist from the saboteur or guerilla, who act directly against their objectives.

Dr. Rudolf Levy, Chief of the Counterterrorist Section at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, identifies three categories of terrorists; the national, transnational and the international.

National terrorists are those operating and aspiring to political power within a single nation. An example is the Weather Underground in the United States.

Transnational terrorists operate across national borders. Their political aspirations are nationalistic, but they may affect citizens of more than one country. The Irish Republican Army (Provisional) bomber is such a terrorist.

The tactics of the national and transnational terrorists are similar. They favor lightning attacks followed by speedy retreats. They avoid prolonged confrontations with police or reaction forces. Murder is preferred to the more dangerous hostage-taking techniques of the international terrorists.

The international terrorists are the professionals. They receive their training in the techniques of terror at paramilitary camps located in Palestine, South Yemen, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and the Soviet Union. As a rule, the activities of the international terrorists represent the national interests of some sovereign state which buys their services. They are, however, ideologues dedicated to the grand strategy of world destablization as opposed to narrower nationalistic goals.

Like Illych Ramirez Sanchez (known as Carlos the Jackal, born of a wealthy family in Venezuela, schooled in terror at Patrice Lumumba University in the Soviet Union and in Cuba on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Muamar Quddafi, and Lebanon) the international serves any cause that meets his or her particular purpose—to disrupt the Western democracies.

In a paper prepared for the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Center, **Intelligence: Its Role in Counterterrorism,** Lt. Col. Alex C. Wylie divides the tasks of the analyst into pre- and post-incident phases. The pre-incident phase is, ". . . to provide the consumer answers to the basic interrogatives: Who? What? Where? When? and Why?"

The best way to collect that data would be to penetrate a targeted terrorist organization. In practice this is almost impossible. Wylie cites, ". . . the length of time needed to establish the

credentials required to be accepted by the group, the cost of supporting long-term operations, the risks to the penetrant, and the improbability that even a successful penetrant will be able to overcome compartmentalization sufficiently to learn anything worthwhile," as the principle negative factors in a penetration operation.

There is another significant obstacle. According to the standard terrorist handbook, **The Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla,** by Carlos Marighella, the would-be recruit to a terrorist organization must, as an act of faith, either rob a bank or shoot a policeman. Beyond establishing his or her **bona fides,** this binds the new member into the group by making him a legal outcast. This poses quite a legal, ethical and moral problem for the government penetration agent.

Thus, in the pre-incident phase of counterterrorist operations the intelligence analyst is constrained to evaluating wall-posters, spray-painted graffitti and mimeographed "communiques"distributed on the streets in assessing a terrorist group's ideology and intentions. Since publicizing themselves and their operations is a goal of the terrorists, such material is easily acquired and valuable.

From their track record, it is also possible to discover the sophistication of the terrorists' training and what kind of weapons and equipment they have. This determines what kind of operations they are capable of mounting: bombings, assassinations, bank robberies, and/or hostage-taking.

In the post-incident phase of a terrorist action, intelligence is the effective, indispensible element of any countermeasures to be taken. In the case of a bombing or assassination, the intelligence task is to draw on evidence from the act in an attempt to [illegible] who was responsible. In the easiest instance, the terrorist group will publicly claim credit for the operation.

In the hostage/barricade situation, intelligence was crucial. In May 1980, the Iranian Embassy in London was occupied by a terrorist group. The British Special Air Services Regiment (SAS), their anti-terrorist action arm, was summoned. According to the officer in charge of the SAS team, Major Ian Crooke, when he and his men arrived at the embassy, they had a 10 percent probability of success against the terrorists should those in charge have chosen to use the military option. During the next six days of the siege, five hostages were released by the terrorists, and were exhaustively debriefed. The SAS team also thoroughly reconnoitered the embassy building outside and (as best they could) inside.

On the sixth day, the terrorists shot one of the hostages and booted his body out the front door. The lives of the other 19 hostages were then deemed to be seriously imperilled. Crooke was consulted by those in charge of siege and negotiations. On the basis of the data base he and his men constructed, he was able to give a 90 percent likelihood of success for an SAS rescue operation. He was ordered to commit his team.

The assault took 30 minutes. Five of the six terrorists were killed. One of the hostages was murdered during the assault. Because of detailed planning, action rehearsals, and effective intelligence collection before the SAS team penetrated the building, it was a complete victory for the counterterrorist forces.

Robert D. and M. Lester Chapman, authors of **The Crimson Web of Terror,** list the essential elements of information developed by the Israelis when planning the Entebbe rescue operation. First [illegible] identified, and all the information on their personalities is retrieved.

Then, "If it is a plane (where the hostages are being held), study the engineering specifications of that particular aircraft. If it is a building, such as the airport terminal at Entebbe, the planners will interview everybody they can locate who has ever been in the building." Architect's plans are invaluable.

These questions should be asked of each released hostage:

1. What is the exact location of the hostages?
2. How many terrorists are there?
3. What is the routine of the terrorists and the hostages?
4. What degree of cooperation is there between the host country and the terrorists?
5. What are the external arrangements of where the hostages are held, identifying all points of exit and entry? Draw a diagram.
6. Where are the electrical circuits and fuse boxes?

Wylie also suggests that technical means be brought to bear to monitor the conversations of the terrorists. Also, an "... appropriate mix of still, movie and television cameras can be exploited for intelligence analysis as well as after-action lessons learned assessments."

It has become apparent that with increasing frequency U.S. military personnel are becoming the victims of terrorist actions. It is important that anyone assigned to an area where terrorists are known to be operating avoid developing a predictable routine, vary the routes taken each morning when going to work and don't become known as a "regular" at any public place. If, for any reason, the suspicion should arise that you are under surveillance, report it. An officer assigned to the embassy in Khartoum told his [illegible] and nobody else, that he thought he was being watched. Four days later he was shot and

(Continued on page 57)

INTELLIGENCE IS FOR THE COMMANDER

IEWSPR 82

INTELLIGENCE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM PROGRAM REVIEW

BG Drummond (Moderator)
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PANEL I

The participants in the Intelligence Electronic Warfare System Program Review (IEWSPR) at Fort Huachuca, are divided into three panels. Panels one and two are viewing IEW in relation to a different time frame.

Panel I is responsible for looking at present capabilities. Its members are to develop recommendations on how existing capabilities can be improved in the 1983 to 1985 time frame.

The members of Panel II are looking at actions from 1985 thru 1990. They are also responsible for conducting an unbiased evaluation of the IEW Mission Area Analysis (MAA).

Panel III is to study the research, development and acquisition process and recommend ways to expedite the fielding of IEW equipment for tactical forces based upon the recommendations of panels one and two.

Some of the proposals, recommendations and conclusions of the panels will be discussed in the next issue of **Military Intelligence.**

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

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

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Tech. Advisor, ERADCOM

Mr. Hovey
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Vint Hill Farms, Warrenton, Va.



Dr. Verhey
Scientific Advisor, USAICS

Reconnaissance on the Extended Battlefield

by Andrew G. Landrus

Throughout history, kings and generals have called upon soldiers to scout out the land and obtain advance knowledge of the enemy prior to committing forces to combat. This tactic was the only means available for reducing uncertainty regarding the adversary and making the right decisions. Modern warfare also requires the commander to see the battlefield as a first step to winning; however the easy comparison with past practice ends here. The increasing complexity of today's battlefield has prompted the development of a wide range of intelligence collection capabilities to enable the American commander to fight and win while outnumbered and outgunned. Unhappily, while in the process of developing new intelligence collection means to meet the growing Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, we have forgotten the more traditional method of "spying out the land." This article proposes adding a long range reconnaissance patrol capability at U.S. Army Corps level to improve intelligence reporting and collection within the corps area of influence. In making this argument, the article will explore the following topics:

- Why seeing the battlefield is more essential for victory than ever before.
- The corps Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Group and its role on the extended battlefield.
- Our bias in favor of machine-generated intelligence.
- The effectiveness of LRRPs on the battlefield.

Soviet doctrine evolving out of the "Great Patriotic War" (World War II) makes seeing the battlefield more important to U.S. forces than ever before. Successful employment of "Vernichtungsdanke" (annihilation) by the Germans in World War II was not forgotten by the Russians and became the basis for Soviet postwar doctrine emphasizing total destruction of the enemy by swift blows at the point of decision on the flanks and in the rear.[1] Subsequent development of tactical chemical and nuclear delivery means further broadened Soviet offensive concepts to include overcoming enemy forces by exploiting intervals and gaps in linear formations, attacking open flanks and breaching defenses at the point where decisive weapons are employed.[2]

> ***How can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?***
>
> **Jomini: Precis de L'Art de La Guerre, *1938***

The very strength of this doctrine, with its emphasis upon rapid movement across Western Europe and massive use of armor, creates vulnerabilities subject to exploitation by a resourceful enemy.[3] Soviets face problems controlling development of the battle in depth, in logistical support, and a lack of expertise within the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.[4]

However, for American forces to take advantage of these weaknesses, it is necessary to see the battlefield in sufficient depth to determine Soviet intentions. To do this, a wide range of intelligence collection means are needed to reduce uncertainty regarding the enemy within the corps area of influence.[5]

Within the Army, the need to see deep behind the forward line of own troops led in the post-Vietnam era to unit reorganizations and a blending of intelligence capabilities at all levels of command.

Concepts such as the "extended battlefield"encouraged further development of intelligence means to view the battlefield and caused the emergence of three basic criteria: first, the battlefield must be observed to a depth great enough to destroy, delay, or disrupt the enemy. Secondly, optimum times for attacking echeloned enemy forces from the FLOT to the rear of respective zones of influence must be identified. And lastly, tactical, theater and national intelligence capabilities must be managed so the first two priorities can be satisfactorily achieved at every level of command.[6]

At corps level, the CEWI Group has been established to accomplish these objectives. It is to do so by managing and correlating the product of three distinct intelligence or "INT" disciplines: signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and human intelligence.[7] Diverse intelligence collection capabilities within these disciplines are employed in support of the corps out to 150 kilometers beyond the FLOT to cover the area of influence and ensure overlap and balance in intelligence tasking and

reporting. Concurrently, the CEWI Group receives reporting from echelons above corps on the corps area of interest from 150 to 300 kilometers from the FLOT.[8] This cooperative intelligence effort allows the corps commander to make an accurate assessment of the enemy situation and properly allocate resources for operations up to 72 hours in the future.[9]In other words,the commander, while planning and executing an attack, is able to find and disrupt second echelon divisions and know where second echelon armies, further to the rear, will later be committed.[10]

Unfortunately, for the corps, the CEWI Group does not have the full range of HUMINT capabilities originally intended.[11] The Long Range Surveillance Company, made up of 18 four-man teams, has been eliminated, leaving the CEWI Group deficient in the HUMINT collection area and largely dependent upon machine-derived intelligence.[12] This has resulted because of American infatuation with technology and an accompanying aversion toward elite units and more traditional methods of intelligence gathering.[13] There is almost a feeling machines can resolve every intelligence problem the Army faces on the modern battlefield. Granted, technology is necessary to counter enemy superiority in numbers; nevertheless, we must not forget human capabilities and the balance and stability they lend to the enterprise of war. Lt. Col. Henry G. Gole in his article, "Bring Back the LRRP," states this point of view succinctly.[14]

The U.S. Army seems prepared to continue to exaggerate the capability of sensitive machines and to denigrate or ignore the reliability of the best gatherer and reporter—a person with a good radio transmitter. We are in danger of failing to make the critical distinction between equipping people and manning equipment.

At the same time, we continue to harbor a great deal of suspicion toward special or elite units and the jobs they perform in wartime.[15] Adverse publicity given to the kind of rear area operation requiring use of covert insertion, technical aids and special communication techniques has made it difficult to substantiate the need for a reconnaissance unit at corps level.[16] One senior Army official implied the LRRP mission is not within the capability of the American character; it's too risky and offers too little in return. Fortunately, it's difficult to forget the past history of success reconnaissance teams have experienced.

One needs only to remember Vietnam to recall efforts made by division commanders to quickly train organic reconnaissance elements and get them into combat zone. It's time now to overcome former prejudices and push for reinstatement of LRRPs within the corps force structure. To do otherwise courts disaster and ignores the likelihood that the next war will not offer sufficient time to mobilize reserves or develop a patchwork reconnaissance capability.[17]

Our bias in favor of machinery also creates several additional problems in intelligence collection. In terms of managing the intelligence collection effort, it's doctrinally sound to use multiple systems to cover the corps area of influence. In this fashion intelligence collectors are mutually supporting, providing tip-offs, developing and refining ever improving intelligence, and preventing enemy deception of friendly forces. Present overdependence on machine intelligence, however, causes a set collection pattern and, in certain situations, gives the Soviets an excellent opportunity to conduct effective cover and deception operations. Moreover, machine systems are particularly vulnerable to a number of courses of action open to the enemy. Use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield alone may well knock

The Second-Echelon Threat



out a significant percentage of our machine capability through the secondary effect of electromagnetic pulse. At the national level, we must also be prepared to satisfy wartime intelligence requirements in light of growing Soviet anti-satellite capabilities.[18]

Adverse weather is another factor unfavorably affecting machine intelligence. In Europe, where cloud cover and reduced visibility are normal occurrences, intelligence system failures are high year round.[19] Unfortunately, this is not the kind of reliability we want to build into our intelligence collection program. More prudent is the development of a system which blends the strengths of all "INT" disciplines and minimizes dependence upon system weaknesses. With regard to LRRPs, this means considering the value of having an asset which is able to report anywhere and at any time within the designated operational zone. Of further significance is the fact this agency is least susceptible to Soviet subterfuge, the effects of bad weather, and does not require perfect functioning of equipment to get the job done.

The need for timely information is also an important consideration in determining proper mix of intelligence collection capabilities. Both ground systems and aerial platforms depend on sophisticated technology to develop and transmit intelligence to the corps. Any number of technical difficulties can cause transmission problems and prevent receiving critical, time sensitive information.[20] Besides, it is well to remember Soviet radio-electronic combat[21] efforts attempt to reduce the effectiveness of command and control, intelligence, and weapon system radio nets to 50 percent or less in wartime.[22] U.S. over-reliance on systems which require elaborate peacetime communication support to function could leave the intelligence analyst "holding an empty bag" when war begins. With these difficulties in mind, it makes good sense not to forget the most sophisticated collector of all—the American fighting man. Give him proper training in reconnaissance and equip him with a burst transmission device, and you've prepared a complete yet simple intelligence reporting system for combat.

And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan and said unto them. . . see the land, what it is; and the people that dwell therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many. Numbers 13:17-18

Another key ingredient to consider in developing collection strategy is the availability of trained personnel to operate and maintain intelligence equipment. Currently, there are significant enlisted and noncommissioned officer shortages within a number of specialty fields in the signal electronic and electronic warfare communities. These shortages are so severe that some newer systems remain unused. In other cases, once equipment fails,it stays unrepaired either because parts are scarce or mechanics are not sufficiently trained to repair the newer systems. At the supervisory level, shortages are so severe the few NCOs available have difficulty training their people to perform wartime missions and, at the same time, preparing them for increasing job responsibilities and higher rank.

Failure to consider these severe personnel shortcomings while preparing a collection strategy creates potential for wartime intelligence failure. It makes eminently more sense to be realistic in assessing your own abilities to perform wartime missions and to construct an intelligence collection plan that is flexible enough to continue operating regardless of projected personnel shortages and equipment breakdowns. Any such plan must include long-range reconnaissance patrols to compensate for machine vulnerabilities and provide a timely reporting capability that makes no excessive demands on scarce personnel or equipment resources.

Among many Army professionals there is a feeling HUMINT assets, currently found in the Tactical Exploitation Battalion, corps CEWI Group, are adequate to complement other "INT" disciplines without adding long-range reconnaissance patrols. As presently configured, the TEB provides interrogation support to the corps, to include document exploitation, and operations security with its dual missions of signals security and counterintelligence. Though these skills offer considerable information and protection to the corps, they do not develop intelligence soon enough to support the corps commander in the most likely European wartime scenarios: either a Soviet surprise attack or an attack after a limited three-to seven-day build up. This is true for a number of reasons: first, interrogation and CI assets in Europe are not initially sufficient to fulfill wartime intelligence needs, and a great deal of support in these areas must come from the United States through reserve mobilization and movement of individual replacements. Secondly, foreign language shortcomings cause immense problems for both disciplines in time of war. Wartime language demands far exceed peacetime abilities of interrogators and CI personnel, and it would be months before U.S. corps would have adequate language support to satisfactorily exploit available human sources of intelligence.

Given these severe limitations on quick development of truly

Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB)



Source: Joseph E. Hines, p. B-4

responsive and timely HUMINT in war, it's easy to see why LRRPs are required! Only with a long-term, gradual build up of tensions is adequate time available to mobilize and train additional interrogation and CI resources. Unfortunately; the Soviets are not likely to post a notice of early intent to initiate hostilities in Europe and other locations. What we require then is a HUMINT agency capable of responding to any scenario and not bound by initial language shortcomings. In terms of assets that could be controlled directly by the corps, only LRRPs can satisfy this job specification.

So far, we have concluded current collection strategy favors use of machine systems and is in need of a LRRP capability at corps to improve the overall intelligence product. As a final matter, we need to review the experience of the U.S. Army and other forces in the employment of LRRP teams to determine how effective they have been to date. Historically, this is an easy task. Rangers in World War II and Korea and Special Forces in Vietnam were extremely successful in the prosecution of war efforts.[23] More recently, this same conclusion has been drawn from Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises involving the United States and her NATO allies.[24] Without exception, allied long range reconnaissance patrols, in support of U.S. forces, have been the single most effective source of timely intelligence behind the FLOT. This has been the case even with the extraordinary measures taken to test and evaluate a wide assortment of very sophisticated intelligence collection platforms and systems. Even more remarkable, this conclusion holds true despite initial awkwardness in working with allied LRRP teams that have diverse operational methods, speak different languages, and use communication means incompatible with our own systems.

Finally, we must not forget the importance the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations place on reconnaissance capabilities. Historically, Soviets employed LRRP teams effectively against both German and Japanese forces in World War II. Concurrently, they faced problems with German diversionary elements in their own rear area and had to employ as many as two security regiments behind each army to neutralize the threat.[25] Today, current estimates project that in central Europe the Warsaw Pact has more than 20,000 specially designated troops for rear area operations.[26] A substantial percentage of these forces form diversionary squads of four to 10 men each and are controlled by Soviet/WP division, army, and front headquarters. Capt. Arthur W. McMaster III, in his article, "Soviet Reconnaissance in the Seventies," said that "Soviet combat reconnaissance is more at home with patrols than with extensive electronic surveillance."[27] He bases his argument on the importance Soviets place on reconnaissance at every command echelon and the training soldiers receive in collection and reporting on the enemy. Furthermore, because of Soviet emphasis upon reconnaissance, NATO faces a significant rear area threat to nuclear ammunition storage points, command and control headquarters, communication sites, and logistical depots.[28] As a matter of prudence, given the emphasis upon LRRPs by both ally and adversary, it makes sense for the Army to reevaluate its position on LRRPs and consider altering collection strategy.

In conclusion, this article has not attempted to detail the makeup of the corps Long Range Surveillance Company nor suggest possible methods for its wartime employment. Rather, these topics have been deferred for later discussion so that full attention could be devoted to the need for reconnaissance patrols within the crops area of influence. In limiting discussion solely to the corps, I have also intentionally chosen not to address divisional intelligence needs because the issue of LRRPs at corps level is of more pressing importance. This is so because it is at this level of command that national and tactical intelligence are first meshed; therefore, it is imperative that balanced reporting be achieved to insure development of an accurate intelligence picture.

Simply stated, the corps commander cannot effectively assess where the main attack is directed and begin to find and disrupt the advance of second-echelon divisions within first-echelon armies without completely dependable intelligence.[29] Failure to provide him with a well-balanced, unbiased product heralds the beginning of the end for the corps and prevents the division commander from fighting first-echelon divi-

sions at a time and place of his choosing.

George Santayana noted, "those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them."[30]

We cannot afford to make Santayana a prophet in this instance and wait for the next war to rediscover the value of LRRPs. If the corps is to survive and control the battlefield within its zone of influence, it must have a balanced intelligence collection strategy. Without the LRRP Company this is highly improbable.

Footnotes

1. Matthew Cooper discusses "Vernichtungsgedanke," the idea of annihilation, and the conflicting "armored idea" while portraying the two sides of German strategic thought existing prior to and during World War II; see, e.g., the author's chapters on "Strategic Tradition" and "Strategic Revolution" **(The German Army, 1933-45** New York: Stein and Day, 1978).
2. A.A. Sidorenko, Col., **The Offensive (A Soviet View)** (Moscow: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 62.
3. C.N. Donnelly, "Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army," **International Defense Review,** September 1978, p. 1409.
4. David L. Cooper, Capt., "Interdiction Planning and Soviet Operations," **Military Intelligence Magazine,** April-June 1980, p. 37.
5. Donn A. Starry, Gen., "Extending the Battlefield," **Military Review,** March 1981, p. 37.
6. Starry discusses the concept of the extended battlefield in great detail in his article, "Extending the Battlefield;" however, he does not consider the extended battlefield to be a new concept. He sees it simply as a term describing what U.S. forces must accomplish through acquisition, targeting, and weapons systems to win the next war.
7. C1, Field Manual 100-5, carefully defines the three distinct "INT" disciplines in Chapter 7, "Intelligence."
8. Ralph Burton defines the corps area of influence as that part of the battlefield where a commander must acquire targets and attack enemy forces with weapons under his direct control. He also describes the corps area of interest as that part of the battlefield extending beyond the area of influence, in depth and width, in which enemy forces capable of affecting a commander's future operations are found. These explanations are detailed by the author in "Military Intelligence Support to Corps and the AirLand Battle," **Military Intelligence Magazine,** July-September 1981, p. 6.
9. U.S. Department of the Army, **Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) (Division),** Field Manual 34-10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 1-12.
10. Donn A. Starry, p. 34.
11. Joseph E. Hines, Lt. Col., Compiler, **Organizational Data for the Army in the Field,** Reference Book 100-1 (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), Appendix B-5.
12. U.S. Department of the Army, **The Commander and Staff** (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1979), page 139.
13. Henry G. Gole, Lt. Col., Back the LRRP," **Military Review,** October 1981, p. 4.
14. Ibid. p. 4.
15. Henry G. Gole, footnote 5, page 10 of his article, notes that Special Forces strength peaked at 10,000 men and seven groups during the Vietnam War and by the mid-70s had dropped to three Special Forces Groups. He finds the Ranger story similar: reactivated in 1950, deactivated in 1951, reactivated in 1974- this time in peace.
16. John A. Hurley, Maj., "HUMINT Revitalization," **Military Review,** August 1981, p. 26.
17. Henry G. Gole, footnote 6, page 10 of his article, notes there are two LRRP units in the National Guard: Company E, 65th Infantry, Puerto Rican Army National Guard and Company E, 425th Infantry, Michigan Army National Guard.
18. Charles D. Daniel, MG, discusses the problem of EMP and possible steps that can be taken to safeguard systems against tactical nuclear weapons in "Status and Needs of Army Intelligence Surveillance, and Target Acquisition," **Electronic Warfare Defense Electronics,** September 1978, p. 66.
19. Henry G. Gole, p. 6.
20. System dependence upon communication links also creates other potential problems. The considerable electromagnetic signature created by the Corps' 86 configuration challenges the most imaginative minds in developing operations security procedures that will allow the corps tactical operations center to survive in wartime.
21. **Soviet Army Operations** discusses Soviet REC and how it combines signal intelligence, direction finding, jamming, deception and suppressive fires to attack enemy organizations and systems through their means of control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978) pp. 5-79 to 5-83.
22. Ibid., p. 5-81.
23. Henry G. Gole, p. 4-5.
24. Andrew M. Rutherford, Col., Ret., discusses the effectiveness of LRRPs in FTX Certain Sentinel (REFORGER 79) and supports this conclusion in his article, "A Fabulous Intelligence Collection System: The Individual Soldier," **Military Intelligence Magazine,** April-June 1981, p. 42. The author of this paper likewise participated in Certain Sentinel and in Certain Rampart (FTX '80) and

found this to be the case in both exercises.

25. C.N. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear-Soviet Doctrine and Tactics," **International Defense Review,** January 1980, p. 38.
26. Ibid., p. 37.
27. Arthur W. McMaster III, Capt., Reserves, "Soviet Reconnaissance in the Seventies," **Military Review,** September 1977, p. 65.
28. C.N. Donnelly, p. 38.
29. Donn A. Starry, p. 37.
30. U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, **History of Military Intelligence** (Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, 1971), p. 1.

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Commander — (Continued from page 2)

major deficiencies. These deficiencies will be studied through a series of meetings. Final recommendations or an action plan describing the best means of correcting or improving the status of our IEW machinery will be presented to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), as well as other SPR attendees. Issues that are determined to be beyond the effective influence of the SPR, given the limitations of time and money, will be identified but no special recommendations will be made.

The IEW-82 SPR effort will be divided among three general officer working groups or panels. Panels 1 and 2 are viewing IEW in relation to different time frames. Panel 1 is looking at present capabilities and developing recommendations on how existing capabilities can be improved in the 1983-85 time frame. Panel 2 is looking at actions from 1985 thru 1990 and is conducting an unbiased evaluation of the IEW Mission Area Analysis (MAA). Panel 3 is studying the research, development and aquisition process to develop recommendations toward expediting the fielding of IEW equipment to tactical forces.

The IEWSPR effort is oriented to the theme "Intelligence is for the Commander." In keeping with that theme, commanders at brigade, division, corps and EAC levels have been interviewed to find out what IEW support they require. Following is the list of questions that were put to various commanders.

a. What sort of change will be brought about by the Airland Battle doctrine?

b. What specific information do you think is most essential for you to accomplish your wartime mission, and why? Please address early warning and post hostility time frames.

c. Of the critical decisions you must make, which ones are most dependent on timely, accurate intelligence?

d. How confident are you that you will have the information you need in time to best allocate your combat power? Where are the weaknesses?

e. If you could change any aspect of your IEW system, what would you change right now, and what would you try to change for the future?

The following commanders have been interviewed:

Gen. Kroesen—USAEUR & 7th Army
Gen. Starry—REDCOM
Lt. Gen. Kingston—RDJTF
Lt. Gen. Williams—V Corps
Lt. Gen. Ulmer—III Corps
Lt. Gen. MackMull—XVIII Abn Corps
Lt. Gen. Livsey—7th Corps
Lt. Gen. Welch—9th Air Force
Maj. Gen. Peter—5th ID
Maj. Gen. Elton—9th ID
Maj. Gen. Galvin—24th ID
Maj. Gen. Mahaffey—3rd ID
Maj. Gen. Partain—1st ID
Maj. Gen. Vuono—8th ID
Maj. Gen. Bagnal—101st Abn Div
Brig. Gen. Hoglan—V Corps ARTY
Brig. Gen. Hamilton—VII Corps
Brig. Gen. Lutz—JFKCENMA
Col. Ostott—3rd Bde, 9th ID
Col. Ivey—6th Air Cav Bde

The interviews were filmed and excerpts will be shown at the SPR in October and later distributed to various Army schools.

The results of the IEWSPR will have far-reaching impact on IEW and its role in supporting future combat operations. The task of taking the recommendations that come out of the SPR and translating them into an improved IEW capability that provides intelligence for the commander will largely fall to those of us in military intelligence.

OPFOR (SOVIET MODEL)

by Bob Moorehead

Tactical air support is an aspect of combat operations which traditionally has been given little attention in scenarios developed for FTX's and CPX's conducted by ground units. This article addresses the manner in which OPFOR (Soviet model) tactical air support should be portrayed.

Soviet military forces are organized so that tactical aviation units are organic operational elements of the ground forces. The tactical air armies of frontal aviation fall under the operational authority of the front commander, to be deployed and committed at his discretion or at the discretion of his designated subordinate commanders.

Frontal aviation assets provide a broad range of support to maneuver units—including highly mobile and responsive means of delivering fire onto enemy ground units. The Soviet military has steadily developed its tactical aviation capability and has integrated it into their doctrinal and tactical concepts.

The development of tactical aviation assets, particularly third generation fixed-wing aircraft (FISHBED J/K/L/N, FLOGGER B/D, FITTER C/D, FOXBAT B/D, and FENCER) and a potent attack/assault helicopter forces, is a major aspect of the Soviet modernization program. In order to be realistic, any OPFOR scenario must include at least notional portrayal of meaningful aviation support to ground operations.

The OPFOR TAA is based on the organization of the 16th TAA, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.



L) TACTICAL AVIATION



Generally, organization is triangular from division level downward. A division has three regiments; a regiment three squadrons; and a squadron three flights. In the OPFOR TAA, four aircraft are assigned to each flight, and they operate in pairs (leader-wingman). Thus, a squadron has 12 aircraft, and a regiment 36.

The aircraft assigned to the TAA represent only a portion of the aviation assets available to support ground operations. Long-range aviation and naval aviation assets also provide support. This article, however, deals primarily with the aviation support organic to the OPFOR Front.

Frontal aviation units perform four basic functions for the front commander:

1. Fighter elements, in coordination with ground-based air defense assets, seek to control the air over the battlefield, protecting the ground forces from Blue Force air attack.
2. Fighter, fighter-bomber, bomber, and helicopter elements provide mobile fire support to the ground forces; attack Blue Force strongpoints, concentrations and C^3; and suppress Blue Force fires to maintain a high rate of advance.
3. Air reconnaissance activities provide pre-battle intelligence and on-going information input during the battle.
4. Transport elements provide airlift for paratroop assault, helicopter-borne assault and rapid movement of supplies and reinforcements.

Initial Air Operations

OPFOR scenarios depict initial air operations as independent of ground operations. Bombers and fighter-bombers from long-range aviation and naval aviation, in addition to frontal aviation assets, conduct the initial air offensive. Initial strikes are against Blue Force nuclear delivery means and associated facilities, air facilities, logistics centers, C^3 facilities, and major force concentrations. The initial offensive includes the use of chemical agents delivered by and missiles following delivery of conventional ordnance. Air attacks against priority targets are completed within approximately 48-hours of their initiation.

During the early part of the offensive, some frontal aviation assets will fly six or more sorties per day. Sustained operations quickly reduce the overall average to approximately four sorties per day. Scenarios should reflect an initial aircraft availability of about 75 to 80 percent.

Ideally, the combination of surprise and persistent attacks will catch the Blue Force unprepared, destroying most of Blue's fighters on the ground. This gives the OPFOR control of the air over the battlefield, degarding the Blue Force's ability to resupply and reinforce. Destruction of the Blue Force's nuclear capability deny that option in efforts to slow the advance of the OPFOR ground forces. Disruption of the Blue Force's C^3 will hamper coordination in attempts to deploy forces to meet the OPFOR advance.

The effectiveness of these initial air operations is completely scenario-dependent and may range from marginal to total—depending upon the desired special situation and training objectives.

Air Support to Ground Operations

The portrayal of aviation operations must be consistent with the Soviets' recent increase in emphasis on air superiority and aggressive support to the ground forces.

As OPFOR ground units begin their advance, frontal aviation's efforts are focused on supporting the advance. Fighter-bombers and bombers continue to attack targets in the Blue Force rear, particularly those nuclear-capable assets and airfields which have survived the initial air strikes. Such strikes may be supplemented by support from long-range aviation assets.

During offensive operations, ground attack aircraft are used to destroy bypassed pockets of resistance and eliminate targets not destroyed by artillery. They also attack Blue Force counter-attack forces and provide flank security. Air strikes are coordinated with artillery fires to provide a complete, integrated, fire plan. Generally, attack helicopters attack targets in close proximity to OPFOR ground forces, and fixed-wing aircraft are used at greater distances attacking targets that are out of range of supporting artillery. However, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters employed against close-in targets must engage quickly to maintain the initiative.

Soviet doctrine maintains that meeting engagements will occur as their forces advance rapidly toward units attempting to deploy to forward defensive positions. To insure success to meeting engagements, Soviet commanders are expected to locate advancing enemy units and identify likely points of contact. Consequently, accurate OPFOR portrayal requires continuous air reconnaissance along the intended line of march.

Air support is considered critical to success in meeting engagements. OPFOR units will depend upon air strikes to destroy Blue Force concentrations, suppress anti-armor fire and degrade the Blue Force's ability to maneuver. Ground attack aircraft protect the flanks of maneuver units. Attacks on mobile targets and suppressive fire on Blue Force concentrations are used to provide OPFOR units with time to coordinate their attack. Air support is particularly important in cases where leading OPFOR elements are decisively engaged before artillery can be brought to bear effectively.

Support from attack aircraft is indispensable to airborne and air-mobile operations. Because such operations often are conducted beyond the range of OPFOR artillery, air strikes are the only means of suppressing Blue Force fires. Fighters are also involved in air-mobile and airborne operations, providing cover for the helicopters, ground attack aircraft, and transport aircraft.

Helicopter Support

The helicopter plays a significant role in OPFOR operations. Helicopters assigned to the TAA are used for attack, assault, transport, and reconnaissance. Helicopter operations are indispensable to the ground force. In fact, early in an offensive, the bulk of the close air support provided to ground units comes from helicopters because of the allocation of fixed-wing ground attack to the initial independent air operations.

In a fire support role, attack helicopters are employed in much the same manner as high-performance fixed wing aircraft. They can be tasked for independent search-and-destroy missions, conduct preplanned strikes against specific targets or operate in coordination with on-going operations on an "on call" basis against immediate targets designated by the ground force commander.

Air superiority over the battle-

field is essential if effective air support is to be provided to ground forces. Therefore, initial missions by OPFOR frontal aviation are predominantly counterair related, either against Blue Force aircraft or the installations which support them. The establishment and maintenance of local air superiority in the area of the main effort receive priority.

The attempt to gain air superiority includes seeking out and destroying Blue Force aircraft in the air and on the ground ***outside the air defense umbrella provided by ground-based air defense assets.*** Though this represents something of a departure from traditional perceptions of Soviet tactics, it reflects a shift to increasingly aggressive tactical aviation operations.

The organic air defense systems of the ground forces themselves represent significant air superiority assets, since they contribute to control of the airspace over their parent units.

Air strikes in support of ground operations are controlled by air representatives attached to first echelon maneuver battalions. Radio is the primary means of control. Beacons, laser designators, flares, smoke, artillery fire, and small arms tracer rounds also may be used to mark targets and identify OPFOR positions.

OPFOR fixed-wing ground attack aircraft penetrate Blue Force airspace traveling at speeds of less than 500 knots, at altitudes of less than 1,000 feet above ground level. They pass over the target close enough to locate it visually. This pass is conducted at a low level to reduce the effectiveness of Blue Force defensive fire. The attacking aircraft then conducts one of a number maneuvers lining up on the target, releasing their ordnance and departing the area—again at low level.

If Blue Force ADA or SAM

FIGHTERS

DESIGNATION	MAXIMUM SPEED	COMBAT RADIUS	SERVICE CEILING	ARMAMENT	REMARKS
MIG-21 FISHBED-C	2,400 Kph	565 Km	18,300m	1x30mm GUN 2xATTOL AA MSL OR 32x57mm RKT	SHORT-RANGE, CLEAR-WEATHER FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR
MIG-21 FISHBED-D	2,400 Kph	565 KM	18,300m	2xATOLL AA MSL	ALL-WEATHER
MIG-23 FLOGGER-B	2,775 Kph	900 Km	18,000m	4xAPEX/APHID AA MSL 23mm GUN	ALL-WEATHER, LIMITED LOOK DOWN—SHOOT DOWN CAPABILITY
MIG-25 FOXBAT-A	3,375 Kph	1,000	18,000m	4xACRID AA MSL	UTILIZED PRIMARILY TO INTERCEPT HIGH-FLYING TARGETS

FIGHTER-BOMBERS

MIG-21 FISHBED-K	2,690 Kph	565 Km	18,300m	23mm GUN 500/1000/1500 LB BOMBS; UP TO 2200 LB TOTAL	ORDNANCE MIX CAN BE VARIED
MIG-27 FLOGGER-D	1,900 Kph	800 Km	15,250m	23mm GUN 500/1000/1500 LB BOMBS; UP TO 8,800 LB TOTAL WEIGHT, AS-7 KERRY, 57mm ROCKETS	ORDNANCE MIX CAN BE VARIED
*SU-24 FENCER-A	2,500 Kph	1,200 Km	18,300m	23mm GUN ASMs, ROCKETS 500/1000/1500 LB BOMBS; UP TO 17,000 LB TOTAL WEIGHT	LONG RANGE INTERDICTION PRIMARY NUCLEAR DELIVERY ASSET HELD IN RESERVE IF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN SCENARIO

BOMBER

YAK-28 BREWER-C	1,260 Kph	800 Km	16,775m	30mm MG ASMs, ROCKETS, 500/1000/1500 LB BOMBS; UP TO 4,000 LB TOTAL WEIGHT	

RECONNAISSANCE

DESIGNATION	MAXIMUM SPEED	COMBAT RADIUS	SERVICE CEILING	EQUIPMENT	REMARKS
MIG-21 FISHBED-G/H	1,223 Kph	900 Km	18,300m	FORWARD-FACING OR OBLIQUE CAMERAS IR DETECTION	
MIG-25 FOXBAT-B/D	3,000 Kph	1,100 Km	26,240m	PHOTO/SLAR	
YAK-28 BREWER-D	1,930 Kph	925 Km	15,250m	PHOTO	
AN-12 CUB-B	724 Kph	1,300 Km	9,150m	ELINT	
AN-12 CUB-C	724 Kph	1,300 Km	9,150m	ECM	
IL-14 CRATE	418 Kph	845 Km	7,320m	ELINT/ECM	MAY BE USED TO PORTRAY AIRBORNE CP, OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT, FAC, OR RADIO-RELAY

TRANSPORT

DESIGNATION	MAXIMUM SPEED	COMBAT RADIUS	SERVICE CEILING	MAX PAYLOAD	REMARKS
AN-2 COLT	180 Kph	450 Km	4,500m	12xPAX	CAN BE USED FOR INSERTING TROOPS BEHIND BLUE FORCE LINES FOR OBSERVATION, OR FOR FAC
AN-12 CUB	670 Kph	1,200 Km	9,150m	100 PARATROOPS 44,000 LB CARGO	PRIMARY OPFOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. 2x23mm GUNS IN TAIL TURRET
AN-22 COCK	740 Kph	5,470 Km	9,150m	170,000 LB	CAN CARRY SCUD-A OR SA-6 ON THEIR TRACKED CARRIERS. THE ONLY OPFOR AIRCRAFT WHICH CAN CARRY 28xPAX IN CABIN FORWARD OF MAIN HOLD
AN-26 CURL	434 Kph	547 Km	7,803m	13,000 LB 40 PARATROOPS 24 LITTERS	USED FOR PINPOINT DROPPING OF FREIGHT, AIRBORNE OPNS, AND MEDEVAC

HELICOPTERS

DESIGNATION	MAXIMUM SPEED	COMBAT RADIUS	SERVICE CEILING	ARMAMENT	REMARKS
MI-2 HOPLITE	210 Kph	280 Km	4,000m	57mm ROCKETS/ AT-3	CAN CARRY 8xPAX OR 1,440 LB CARGO
MI-8 HOOK	300 Kph	365 Km	4,500m	CAN HAVE 12.7mm MG IN NOSE	CARRIES UP TO 60xPAX OR 28,450 LB FREIGHT
MI-8 HIP-C	280 Kph	390 Km	4,500m	128x57mm ROCKET	PRIMARILY USED TO DELIVER ASSAULT TROOPS, COMBAT EQUIP. & SUPPLIES BEHIND BLUE FORCE LINES UP TO 28xPAX/8,500 LB CARGO
MI-8 HIP-D	280 Kph	280 Km	4,500m	128x57mm ROCKET	ELECTRONIC MISSION VARIANT. AIRBORNE COMMAND/RADIO-RELAY/ECM.
MI-8 HIP-E	280 Kph	280 Km	4,500m	1x12.7mm MG, UP TO 192x57mm ROCKET, 4xAT-2.	MOST HEAVILY ARMED HELICOPTER IN THE WORLD. CAN DELIVER ASSAULT TROOPS AND PROVIDE SUPPRESSIVE FIRES.
MI-24 HIND-D	287 Kph	240 Km	5,000m	4-BARREL 12.7mm MG, 64x57mm ROCKET, 4xAT-2. CAN CARRY 2x500 LB BOMBS.	ATTACK/ASSAULT HELICOPTER. CAN CARRY 8 COMBAT-EQUIPPED TROOPS. CAN USE MG/MISSILES/ROCKETS IN AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT.
MI-24 HIND-E	287 Kph	240 Km	5,000m	AS HIND-D EXCEPT AT-6 VICE AT-2.	AS HIND-D
MI-28 HALO	290 Kph	400 Km	4,500m		PROBABLE RE-PLACEMENT FOR MI-8 HOOK. CAN CARRY UP TO 20 TONS OF CARGO.

*The OPFOR TAA has no SU-24s organic. However, aircraft can be portrayed as supporting the OPFOR front's operations.

operators observe the direction of flight in the first low-level pass, and prepare for the aircraft to climb into view from that direction, they could bring effective anti-aircraft fire to bear. However, should the first aircraft in the attack get through, each successive aircraft would benefit from the suppressive impact of the one before.

If effective defensive fire is received from Blue Force ground forces, strike aircraft can be diverted from their primary target in order to suppress the defensive fires. Depending on the availability of OPFOR aircraft, this could reduce or eliminate damage to the primary target.

The pitch-up or toss bombing method does not carry the liabilities of the other maneuvers, since the aircraft can release its ordnance from a greater distance. However, this is a comparatively delicate maneuver, requiring precise speeds, angles, headings and release points. Moving targets are extremely difficult to hit using the toss bombing method. Against stationary targets toss bombing can be effective as a suppressive measure to be followed up by other ground attack tactics.

Aircraft approach targets at low altitudes to avoid detection. Routes are planned to avoid the majority of the Blue Force anti-aircraft elements. Sheltered corridors are chosen when possible. Once Blue Force airspace has been penetrated, the shortest undefended route to the target will be used.

Rocket and missile attacks are conducted against mobile targets, while bombs are used against stationary or hardened targets.

Fighters and fighter-bombers operate in pairs. Fighter-bombers are escorted by covering fighters unless complete air superiority has been achieved.

Fixed-wing aircraft are not tied to established airfields, but may operate from hard-surface roads. They would be supported (refueled and rearmed) by prepositioned elements of their parent units.

Helicopter gunships are used in coordination with fixed-wing aircraft for mutually supporting strikes. The primary targets for attack helicopters are tanks and other armored vehicles. Other targets include anti-tank assets and Blue Force troop concentrations.

Attack helicopters fly in groups of four, with two or more of these flights operating in the same area. They can conduct low-level strafing runs with machine guns and rockets and, at higher altitude, drop bombs. One group can act as a diversion to draw attention and fire while another group closes in for the attack. Sequenced attacks on multiple axes may be conducted.

Helicopters can also be used as a mobile anti-tank reserve. In this role, they employ "pop-up" tactics, using vegetation and terrain for cover and concealment.

Helicopters may be employed to provide suppressive fire on Blue Force defenses while fixed-wing aircraft deliver ordnance on primary targets. Conversely, fixed-wing aircraft often fly overhead cover for attack helicopters.

Helicopters also have a limited air-to-air combat capability. OPFOR helicopters may be targeted against Blue Force attack and assault helicopters, firing machine guns, rockets and missiles.

Contrary to widespread belief, Soviet forces do not rely totally on massive artillery barrages to pave the way for their maneuver forces. Soviet tacticians recognize that having ground attack aircraft provide very close support to ground units allows troops on the ground to exploit the results of these strikes immediately.

Soviet forces conduct training designed to meld motorized rifle, tank, and tactical aviation units into a fully integrated combat team. Realistic training requires that OPFOR scenarios include

meaningful portrayal—actual or notional—of tactical air support.

Although OPFOR tactical aircraft are organic to the Tactical Army, their employment is decentralized. Decentralized operations of helicopter assets are particularly significant in OPFOR portrayal. The employment of assault helicopters should be portrayed as a part of all OPFOR division operations—not just a characteristic of the Front's or Army's main attack.

The main point is that realism in training cannot be achieved if tactical air support is treated as an afterthought—or an add-on element of OPFOR operations. Whether the scenario being developed is for a CPX or an FTX, it is important that meaningful portrayal of tactical air support be included, and that the tactical aviation "play" be consistent with the doctrine and tactics of the Soviet model.

When developing tactical air support "play" for OPFOR scenarios refer to the charts in this article.

Viewpoint (Continued from page 3)

organization and more concerned with goal-seeking. Commanders make tactical decisions in the course of executing an operations order. They make decisions about doctrine in designing organizations and in equipping the forces, in developing concepts for how to fight and how to train. Doctrine concerns the "general," not the "particular" for a specific unit or theater of deployment. SOP's supplement doctrine and adapt it for particular units and locations. During the conference, therefore, we were looking for the "general," which is broadly Applicable, leaving the "particular" for each specific unit to spell out in SOPs.

The quality of presentations brought from the field by G-2s exceeded my expectations. They did not lead to the kind of arguments and misunderstanding that were predicted. Thus, they were testimony to the level of competence and professionalism that MI Branch has achieved by this 20th year of its existence. It also seemed to me that the presentations and panel discussions surprised many of the attendees with the level of sophistication their peers in other units have developed. They discovered far more common ground than differences. They also taught me a great deal. The wealth of insight was truly impressive, and I personally left the conference much richer from the experience.

The task of sifting and organizing the material from the conference will be enormous. Getting a draft FM to press is not going to be easy, but it is certainly possible after the conference in a way that it was not beforehand. On the whole, I remain optimistic that the conferees will see the fruits of their labors in the coming weeks.

Finally, I took away from this conference a greater sense of confidence in the quality of senior intelligence officers in the tactical forces. They are a group of which we can all be proud, and as the G-2 for the Chief of Staff of the Army, I feel that I can tell him that indeed he and his commanders are being well served by his senior intelligence officers at a time of great change and innovation, but also at a time of serious constraints in equipment and personnel. The participants in this two-day crash effort at codifying our tactical intelligence doctrine deserve a round of applause from all of us in Army intelligence.

THE CRYPTOCORNER

1. ENCRYPTED POETRY—
VERY BLANK VERSE.
NOT HARD TO SOLVE,
BUT THE NEXT ONE IS
WORSE.

Cipher Alphabet—

MIBRANCHDEFGJKLOPQSTUVWXYZ
ZTRADOCBEFGHIJKLMNPQSUVWXY

2. TRY THIS ENIGMA—
NOT EASILY WORKED.
ANY WHO TRIUMPH
SOME DUTY THEY
SHIRKED.

Cipher Alphabet—

MIBRANCHDEFGJKLOPQSTUVWXYZ
BEFGHIJKLMNPQSUVWXYZTRADOC

FIELD OPERATIONS OF A DIVISION'S ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

by Capt. Robert Burnham

This article will examine the organization and operations of an All Source Intelligence Center that has been in existence since September 1980. It will attempt to explain what the wartime mission of an ASIC is, how it accomplishes this mission, its relationships with outside agencies, actual operations, and problems that are inherent in the current system. What is explained below is based on my experiences as the OIC of the 3d Armored Division ASIC. The procedures and practices discussed are the ones currently employed by the division ASIC. They were field tested during REFORGER '81.

MISSION OF THE ASIC

The mission of the ASIC is to provide the commander with intelligence based upon multiple source analysis of combat information and intelligence from higher echelons. This can be broken down further by stating that the ASIC performs three functions: Event Analysis, Target Nomination and Mission Planning Support. Event Analysis is the process of looking at the battlefield to determine what the enemy's current and future intentions are. The ASIC does this by analyzing both the First and Second Echelon Battle.

First Echelon Analysis can be defined as providing the commander with the most accurate picture of what is happening to his immediate front. The First Echelon Battle, as defined by the Airland Battle Doctrine is limited to those forces that are committed to the division sector and are within 15 kilometers of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area.

Second Echelon Analysis attempts to locate and identify those enemy forces that are within the division's Area of Interest. The DAI can be defined in terms of either time (within 72 hours of the FEBA), distance (within 150 kilometers of the FEBA) or echelon (1st Tactical Echelon). Additionally, the ASIC is responsible for those enemy second echelon forces within the division's Area of Influence. Like the DAI, the DAIN can be defined in terms of time (within 24 hours of the FEBA) or distance (within 70 kilometers of the FEBA). The ASIC must be concerned with locating and identifying those units in the DAIN, and also identifying their most likely course of commitment. Once the enemy's course of commitment has been identified, the ASIC is responsible for nominating the enemy forces as targets.

The Second Function of the ASIC is to provide targeting support to the Fire Support Element and to subordinate units. Targeting is accomplished by providing the appropriate agency with accurate information on the location and type of enemy. Targets are anything that if fired upon will either delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy. Therefore, a target could be a bridge, a key intersection, a radio relay site, or a column of armored vehicles.

The final function of the ASIC is to provide support to other staffs and subordinate commands in the area of mission planning. Mission planning is not limited to writing an intelligence estimate for an upcoming operation. It also involves providing the commander with intelligence prior to the operation and forecasting what information will be needed during the operation. This forecasting must be done in conjunction with Collection, Management and Dissemination Section, which tasks the collection resources to obtain the needed information.

CURRENT METHODLOGIES

The method used by the 3d Armored Division ASIC to accomplish its mission is Battlefield Functional System Analysis. This is also referred to as the Node Analysis. BFSA looks at the battlefield not in its entirety, but by systems that can be found. Each system is analyzed separately first and then in relation to its function with other systems. These systems can be subdivided into nine separate areas: C^3; fire support (i.e., artillery and surface-to-surface missiles); maneuver forces; ADA; aviation; engineers; reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; radio electronic combat; and logistics. When analyzing each system, the idea is to identify its critical nodes during that phase of the operation. A critical node can be defined as that part of a system which, if destroyed or neutralized, will severely limit the operations of that system. A critical node is situation dependent and will change as the operation changes. A good

example of a critical node is the Straight Flush Radar, used to provide illumination and guidance for the SA-6 surface-to-air missile. By eliminating the straight flush, the SA-6 system is closed. By knocking out the SA-6, the primary means of air defense for the Soviet division is destroyed.

As stated previously, another important mission of the ASIC is to provide targeting data for the FSE and subordinate commands. To expedite this, a targeting letter of instruction is developed. The letter of instruction establishes procedures between the ASIC and those who receive the targets, with the intention of providing accurate targets in the fastest way possible.

Additionally, the ASIC spends considerable time identifying key bridges, intersections, and choke points along the enemy's Second Echelon Line of Advance. It also identifies possible artillery and command post locations, LZs and DZs, assembly areas, and possible chemical and nuclear targets. During REFORGER '81 the 3AD ASIC produced, on the average, over 500 nominations a day. While many of them were never fired, they provided an excellent picture of where the enemy could go and how he would have to deploy once he was there.

The third methodology developed and employed by the ASIC (with the CM&D) was a planning matrix. This matrix is used as a tool to determine what pieces of information the commander would need, prior to or during the operation, to ensure its ultimate success. A matrix has been developed for every conceivable operation the division could possibly be expected to execute. An example of a matrix that proved to be successful was for an airmobile operation.

During REFORGER, the division decided to conduct an airmobile insertion of an infantry battalion, approximately 10-15 kms behind the Blue Forces lines.

The information that was needed before the opertion was:

1. Projected Weather
2. Terrain
a. Company size landing zones.
b. Routes in and out.
(1) Best Map-Of-The-Earth Routes
(2) High wire obstacles (a major problem in Germany).
3. Enemy Forces:
In the vicinity of the LZs and the objective;
Capable of responding to the insertion;
Air defense radars and guns.

Over the past decade a wide variety of collection systems have been introduced into the Army's inventory. These systems support the tactical commander by providing his intelligence analysts with the best obtainable information about the enemy. Although great strides have been made in the area of intelligence collection, the analytical side of the house has been neglected. The division All Source Intelligence Center is a prime example of such neglect.

Information that was to be vital once the insertion was made was:

1. When would the enemy detect/notice that the insertion was made?
2. Enemy reaction to it:
a. What forces would he use to cut off the insertion?
b. Where would they come from?
c. What routes would they use to reinforce/counterattack?
d. What could be targeted (i.e., bridges, key intersections, CPs, etc.) to delay or destroy these forces.

As already stated, the Collection Management and Dissemination Section must be involved with this process from the very beginning. Once the ASIC has identified the intelligence gaps that must be filled, it is the CM&D's job to task the available resources to fill them.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

There appears to be two schools of thought about with whom the ASIC should communicate. The first, prevalent in the old Intelligence Production Section, believed that the ASIC should have its own means of communication. This led to several problems:

The ASIC would be tasking collection assets (like SOTAS) without the knowledge of the CM&D.

The ASIC was constantly being interrupted with calls from other agencies requesting information.

The second school of thought is that the ASIC should talk to no one. All information coming into or out of the ASIC should go through the CM&D. This method prevents both of the above problems. First, if the ASIC has no phone, it cannot task anyone. Second, the CM&D acts as a funnel for the information that the ASIC receives. If a call comes in from one of the brigades, the CM&D tries to answer their question first. If it cannot answer the question, then the ASIC is called. This screening prevents the ASIC from being deluged with calls for information that are not related to what the ASIC is doing. (For example, the majority of calls were for an accurate front line trace, of which the CM&D kept a current copy). Hence, the ASIC could devote a considerable amount of time performing its missions, while relying on the CM&D to perform its dissemination function. However, for the CM&D to be able to do this, they have to keep a copy of everything the ASIC sends out and be extremely knowledgeable about

the current situation.

ASIC's relationship with the subordinate units is predicated on the belief that the primary mission of the division is to fight the Second Echelon Forces, while the primary responsibility of the brigades is to fight the First Echelon Forces. The 3d Armored Division G-2/S-2 relationship rests firmly upon this. The division does not expect any information from the Brigades (other than prescribed SITREPS) unless it falls into one of the following categories:

1. The brigade is facing an enemy force that is larger than projected by the intelligence estimate. This is important to know, because the enemy only has so many forces available to him to deploy within the sector. If a larger force is present then one of the other brigades is opposed by a smaller force that expected; which means the division commander may want to reallocate resources.
2. The brigade is facing an enemy that is smaller than was expected. This information is important to know, for reasons opposite those cited above. If the enemy is not opposing it, then another brigade has a stronger enemy facing it; hence, again, a possible need to reallocate resources.
3. Any indications of the use of chemical or nuclear weapons.
4. Any unusual activities such as: airmobile/airborne, first contact, and rear area sabotage or espionage.

The strict adherence to these guidelines during REFORGER kept the calls between the G-2 and subordinate units to a minimum. It allowed the ASIC to operate in a relatively uninterrupted environment. The brigades received the information that they required (usually in SITREPS and INTSUMS).

During REFORGER the ASIC's relationship with the corps ASIC and other agencies was no different from its relationship with anyone else. All information that was received from or sent to them went through the CM&D. Since much of the information that was requested was already in the CM&D's hands, CM&D could answer most questions. When an analyst needed to talk with an analyst, one would be called from the ASIC. If an ASIC analyst needed to talk to one of their analysts, he would go to the CM&D to use one of their means of communication.

Even though this isolation of the ASIC often appears on paper to cause a lot of inconvenience, in fact, it allowed the ASIC to analyze in a relatively interruption-free environment. For this system to work, it requires:

- A CM&D section that will not allow anyone through to the ASIC unless the reason is justified.
- A CM&D that is aware of the current situation and can answer questions about the First-Echelon Battle.

ASIC INTERNAL ORGANIZATION/ OPERATIONS

The internal operations of the ASIC can be divided into three areas: Operations Planning, First Echelon Operations, and Second Echelon Operations. Though Operations Planning is a major activity of the ASIC, it is not done on a regular basis. Therefore, the organization is modified according to the needs of the plan. However, since First and Second Echelon operations are analyzed constantly, the ASIC is organized with them in mind.

With the information provided to the ASIC by only one source (the CM&D), it is a simple matter to channel it through one person, the Journal Clerk. The Journal Clerk has three responsibilities: (1) To log all incoming messages. (2) To log all outgoing messages. (3) To control access into the ASIC. The Journal Clerk is responsible for ensuring that all visitors are stopped to determine if they really have a need to come into the ASIC. This is an extremely important job, for if done correctly it allows the analysts to work without constant distractions. Because the job requires someone who can say no, it should be someone with rank.

The focal point of the ASIC is the Order of Battle Technician Once a message is logged in, he determines where it should go and with what priority. If it is a First Echelon maneuver unit it will be posted on the First Echelon Map by the First Echelon Analyst. His job is to track the First Echelon units that are provided by our maneuver units. His area of interest only extends out to 15 kilometers from the FEBA. He is responsible for keeping the CM&D updated on the current First Echelon Battle and for targeting those units he tracks.

If the information is not a First Echelon maneuver unit, the OB technician passes the data to the appropriate systems analyst. Each systems analyst is responsible for analyzing three systems: Analyst 1: C3, RSTA, and REC. Analyst 2: fire support, ADA, and aviation. Analyst 3: Second Echelon Maneuver Forces, engineers, and logistics. Ideally there would only be one system for each analyst. However, this would create a requirement for nine System Analysts for each shift, a luxury division cannot expect.

The Analyst is responsible for maintaining a separate overlay for each of his systems on the Second Echelon Mapboard. By

doing this each system is analyzed in its relationship to the other systems. Additionally, each Analyst must ensure that the First Echelon Mapboard is kept current with the relevant information about his systems. His final responsibility is to develop targets based upon his analysis of the enemy forces he is tracking.

The Order of Battle Technician has the responsibility of ensuring that the products the ASIC prepares on a regular basis go out in a timely manner. These products include: intelligence summaries, briefings, spot reports, and the commander's battle book. While no one is assigned the duties of preparing them, all analysts, regardless of rank, are required to know how. The OB Technician tasks the analysts, based on their workload at that time.

The shift OIC does not become involved in the actual production of intelligence. His primary function is to coordinate the activities of the ASIC so that it operates within the tasking parameters given by the CM&D and set by the G-2. He coordinates with the other G-2 sections and with the operations officer to determine the requirements for the ASIC. Finally, he is the one who must ensure that the ASIC is not interrupted by unnecessary visitors.

The last position, although not assigned to a specific shift, is the Section Sergeant. He has the duty of ensuring that the administrative support of the section is there. He is concerned with the health and welfare of the section and sees that the section is not lacking anything. He also fills in the shifts as needed. Since many of the duties are outside the ASIC, he sets his own schedule, dependent upon mission requirements.

To fill the positions as explained above, the ASIC would need the following personnel as a minimum for each shift:

1. Tactical Intelligence Officer	**0-3/0-2**	**35A**	**1**
2. Order of Battle Technician	**WO**	**964A**	**1**
3. Senior Intelligence Analyst	**E-6**	**96B**	**1**
4. Order of Battle Analysts	**E-5**	**96B**	**4**

This would give each shift seven personnel, or a total of 15 for the ASIC. (A variation of this was employed by the ASIC during REFORGER. The only difference was that the number of OB Analysts available was three per shift and one of them was actually a SIGINT Analyst.)

UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS

A common assumption about the ASIC is that since the section is an All Source Analytical Section it analyzes raw data received from every conceivable source. This assumption is about as far from the truth as it can be. The ASIC never receives raw data from any source other than SOTAS. Any information that is received has already been analyzed by those who first received it. This holds true for every source, whether it is ELINT, COMINT, PHOTINT, HUMINT, or from one of the subordinate units. Because the information has already been analyzed, the ASIC collates intelligence based and produces an all source product.

While it can be said that the raw data needs to be analyzed by the experts first, there is one major fallacy in this viewpoint. If the initial single source analysis is incorrect, then the end product is likely to be incorrect data from the very beginning. This defeats the purpose of having multiple source analysis.

In reality, each collector analyzes his specialized information and provides it to the ASIC. The Technical Control and Analysis Center of the CEWI battalion specializes in collecting and analyzing SIGINT. The Interim Tactical ELINT Processor at corps provides ELINT through the Tactical Users Terminal. Air Recce results filter down through the corps ASIC. Again the information is provided, but always in an analyzed form.

The second major problem that confronts the analyst is the timeliness of the data received. Too often the turn around time from the collector to the user is several hours, if not several days. This is especially true with PHOTINT and HUMINT. Most information of interest to the division is useless to the user if it is not received within a couple of hours. By the time the Air Recce Extraction Report reaches the division, the information is obsolete. Experience has shown that if the EXREPS arrive, it takes at least 24-hours to get them.

The final problem that needs to be solved is the TO&E of the ASIC. The ASIC appears to be designed for a collection system that provides raw data to the division level analyst. Since it is apparent that the system is designed so that the ASIC will receive very little raw data, then a revision of the current MTO&E needs to be made. Some deficiencies in the current MTO&E are:

1. The ASIC is authorized two captains. To assign two individuals of the same grade to the same organization, to do the same basic job, is a violation of the principal of the single chain of command.

2. Since the ASIC does not analyze any raw ELINT or COMINT, there is not a need for SIGINT personnel. They would be better employed at the TCAC. If they do stay in the ASIC, they would only be doing Order of Battle analysis. Therefore the following personnel should not be authorized.

Description	Rank	MOS
EW/Cryptological Officer	03	37A
Traffic Analysis Technician	WO	982A
Chief Signal Analyst	E-7	98J
EW/SIGINT Analyst	E-7	98C
EW/COMM Intelligence Analyst	E-5	98C
Emitter Locator-ID Technician	WO	988A

3. Air Recce results do not reach the division in a timely manner. When they do reach the division, they have always been preceded by a written report which gives the necessary information. Hence there is no need for Image Interpreters within the ASIC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Two recommendations for improvement of the division's All Source Intelligence Center, is to change the MTO&E to reflect the realities of the situation, and a new MTO&E should look like this:

Description	Rank	MOS	Number
Tactical Intelligence Officer	0-3	35A	1
Tactical Intelligence Officer	0-2	35A	1
Order of Battle Technician	WO	964A	2
Intelligence Sergeant	E-7	96B40	1
Senior Intelligence Analyst	E-6	96B30	2
Intelligence Analyst	E-5	96B20	4
Intelligence Analyst	E-4	96B10	4

The second recommendation is in the area of doctrine. TRADOC/USAICS must develop a "How To" manual for employment operation of an All Source Intelligence Center and one of the use of Battlefield Functional System Analysis. The term has been used now for several years, but there is no reference book that explains it thoroughly.

CONCLUSION

If the Army is ever going to exploit the full benefits of having a wide array of collection assets, it must be willing to bring the end product users, such as the ASIC, up to the same level of sophistication as the collectors. The Intelligence community needs to devote its energy to developing doctrine that reflects Battlefield Functional System Analysis and is devising an analytical system that can fully analyze the information that is provided by the collectors. Unless the information can be properly analyzed, it will remain only information, not intelligence.

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Duties, MOS 97B Applications for Counterintelligence Duties, MOS 97B

Soldiers serving in oversea areas may submit an application for MOS 97B training anytime after arrival in the overseas unit. There is no requirement to wait until 12 months prior to DEROS. Since the inception of this policy, there has been only one application received in MILPERCEN. All personnel involved in the recruitment and interviewing of MI applicants are requested to publicize this policy change. Details are in Chapter 7, AR 614-200 and Procedure 3-33, DA Pam 600-8.

TERRORISM: The causal factors

The Italian Red Brigades and the West German Baader-Meinhof Gang

by Capt. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Introduction

Who are the terrorists? Where do they come from? Why do they choose terror to achieve their goals? What is at the heart of their motivation?

The above questions have perplexed Western society from the late sixties to the present. The actual manifestations of terrorism are well-known. Political murder, kidnapping, bombing and the slaughter of innocents are well documented. These incidents are thrust upon our consciousness through the auspices of the mass media. News coverage of this type serves only the terrorist, since often the primary goal of the terrorist is to achieve nationwide or worldwide attention for his cause. The incidents of terrorism and their effect on their target audience is largely outside the scope of this article. What will be primarily addressed are the causal factors and, hopefully, at least a partial answer to the **why** of terrorism.

The focus of this analysis is on two countries: West Germany and Italy. Both serve as excellent examples of post industrial Western nations. Both countries suffered defeat at the hands of the Allied powers in World War II, both have a fascist history and both are today considered progressive democratic countries genuinely concerned about the welfare of their populations. West Germany, in particular, has erected a social welfare state which handles the needs of the poor in exemplary fashion.

The two terrorist organizations that will be discussed are the Red Brigades of Italy and the Baader-Meinhof Gang of West Germany.

Commonalities of Italian and German Terrorism of the Left

First it would be useful to define terrorism and to discuss the causal factors common to both countries. Although there appears to be no universally accepted definition, the following should suffice: Terrorism is the weapon of the weak. It is political violence designed to create a climate of fear in a target population. Its purpose in Western societies is to facilitate the downfall of the government in office. Through violence, the terrorist hopes to discredit the government by proving to the population that its government cannot protect the people. It is the weapon of the weak because those who have power seek to protect it. Those without power have nothing to protect and nothing to lose.

A critical element in this terrorist plan is the mass media. Newspapers, magazines and, most of all, television provide the terrorist with the perfect vehicle for spreading the fear so necessary to his goals. Without the media, terrorism could not hope to have the global effect it's had over the last 15 years. Terrorism is often **well orchestrated** political violence not directed at the immediate victims of the act, but instead at the larger audience of the population.

The terrorist movements of West Germany and Italy are predominantly left-wing; but unlike the Marxist view of revolution, they (the terrorists) are not members of the oppressed proletariat. They are instead representative of the bourgeoisie, or the middle and upper-middle classes. They are the children of bureaucrats, professional people and well-to-do businessmen. They are the affluent offspring of our democratic societies. These persons provide the cadre of modern terrorism. "What is, however, far more difficult to understand is the spectacle of individuals who seem to have no objective reasons for complaining about their material condition and their place in society, becoming completely alienated and turning to the most extreme movements, with the aim of destroying the very society that provides them with very generous benefits."[1]

It is the university system that has borne the brunt of responsibility for the creation of these malcontents. It is here that the young mind is introduced to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Castro, Ho Chi Minh and others. It is the university that provides a far reaching look at the rest of the world: a world that is largely in

poverty. At the same time, the student enjoys the leisure and affluence of Western society. It is the children of the wealthy who seem to share a collective guilt for the lot of the poor. After all, these children have done nothing to earn their status. That which they have has been given to them.

This is not to say that the children of wealth all feel this guilt. They do not. There is a minority of them that do have feelings of this nature, and it is these students that are ripe fruit for a terrorist cause. The artificial environment of the university nurtures these feelings of the young of the upper and middle classes. Leftist professors extol the virtues of socialism and the decadence of the capitalist society in which they live. The contradictions of Western society provide fertile fields for the sowing of such seeds.

Radical ideas are not unheard of in the poorer quarters of the alienated, disenfranchized, oppressed and victimized classes; but even they, for the most part, are willing to work through the bureaucracy to achieve their goals. Poor working men attempting to keep their families fed and clothed are not likely to turn to insurrection as a primary means to improve their lot when other means exist. Those means do exist in West Germany and to a lesser degree in Italy today. It would seem that, although the extolers of terrorism today claim they are working for the poor, the poor would find little in common with the terrorists themselves. With the benefit of liberal university education, the dedicated terrorist simply argues that the masses have to be led to revolution, and who better for the job than himself? Of course, there are examples of blue-collar terrorists, but it should be noted that they are in the distinct minority.

Most terrorists grow up in an affluent home and have nearly all their material needs cared for. Their most pressing daily problems might revolve around what to wear to school and how to spend their allowance. They do not have to struggle to obtain anything. It is often a home where the parents substitute material goods for their time and care. At a time when parental guidance is most crucial, namely adolescence, many children of wealthy families are left to fend for themselves. This neglect leaves in the youth an emotional, intellectual and spiritual void that longs to be filled. In a home such as this, there is no meaningful family life. The parents have normally worked hard to establish their positions and want to enjoy the prerequisites of their status. They appreciate all they have because they have had to work for it. It is also possible that the parents grew up in a closer family system and that they may not possess the liberal university education of their children. Their concerns revolve around maintaining the status quo; they are conservative and for the most part would reject radicalism.

. . . terrorism is exciting. For the bored, over-indulged and alienated children of wealth, violence is the ultimate form of self-expression, freedom and self-indulgence. . .

This is not the only home scenario. Another type of terrorist breeding ground is again found in the upper and middle classes.

> These children are raised in permissive homes, are not taught self-restraint, and grow up with ideals, but find that their parents have generally made a compromise with the harsh realities of the world, cannot do much to further their ideals, and appeared to have betrayed them.[2]

In other words, their parents have compromised their ideals for money. To the liberally educated, idealistic and recently politicized youth, this betrayal of beliefs might be irreconcilable. The resulting confusion is at this time when the youth is most vulnerable to ideas of the left and radicalism. These are the youths that are looking for easy answers to extremely complex problems; and because of the inherent impatience of youth, they want solutions now! Terrorism as a means to achieve liberation, justice and a better way of life for the masses probably seems attractive to the now alienated young man or woman. It should be noted that men make up the vast majority of the terrorist ranks. There are women to be sure, Ulrike Meinhof not the least of these, but women normally work as support personnel in terrorist operations.

The permissiveness of the terrorist's parents, their lack of guidance and failure to take the time to explain the inconsistancies of life; in fact, a failure to provide their children with purposes for their lives and a structure for living it; all provide the vacuum into which the potential terrorist eventually falls. Adding to these difficulties at home are the anxieties brought on by society.

Post-industrial Western society is an extremely complex place in which to grow up. A number of problems given so much time by the press are nearly insoluable. Poverty is with us to stay. The possibility of nuclear war is constant. Even many of the troubles we can address have only partial answers. Youth have left religion in droves and now exist without moral structure in their lives unless some was provided in the home. This is true of both Italy and West Germany as well as most of the Western world.

The problem is one of credibility of Western institutions.

Politics, to many, particularly the young, has lost much of its allure as a means to change society itself. In Italy, many terrorists were those who rejected the compromising stance of the Italian communists and accepted terrorism only when they saw it as the only way to have effect. Political corruption is common in Italy and often given wide media coverage, bolstering the view that the system is dysfunctional, politicians are corrupt and the periodic reform programs that inevitably follow exposed corrupt officials really have little effect. Entering politics is seen as betrayal of the people under the present systems. The left terrorist groups seem to offer the only logical alternative to the alienated and educated youth that feel that they have no other means of worthwhile political expression except violence. These problems are compounded by psychological factors.

When the basic needs of an individual are satisfied, new needs become preeminent: the need for recognition, self-fulfillment and the feeling of belonging to something larger than himself. These feelings are largely unfulfilled for the alienated youth of the affluent, at least in the case of the young terrorist. An idealistic and politicized university student sees little to admire in corporate entities such as Fiat or Krupp. These companies are perceived as interested in making profit and certainly not correcting the inequities and injustices of life.

> . . . the groups in question lack the following: a purpose in life; an explanation of the meaning of our world and of life; the ability to believe in something, to identify with something higher than their own persons, and to dedicate themselves to a higher ideal, to strive for more than the mere gratification of their material needs; the security derived from dedication to an ideal and from membership in a larger group; and the companionship and love of real family life.[3]

As a terrorist, all of the above needs can be satisfied. Not only is the terrorist recognized by his peer group, but by a world following his act of violence. Through this framework, he draws self-fulfillment and a feeling of belonging.

The discipline that has been missing in his life until he joined a terrorist group is now provided in full measure. Obedience and absolute order are essential to any organization of this type. The young man who has lost respect for his country's political institutions, religion and his parents finds something noble and important in his struggle to overcome the structure of the society which he sees as oppressive. In this he also finds the justification for his actions. He sees himself as a hero, a freedom fighter and a potential leader of a future revolt.

'The Guerrilla's Language is action,'. . . action included bank robbery, bombings, and murder;. . .

They often see themselves as part of the greater world terrorist movement and thus have a feeling of solidarity with their terrorist brethren in other countries of the West and Third World. This romantic idea of world terrorist solidarity is a manifestation of how terrorists think. They feel the need to be a part of something outside themselves and to dedicate their lives to some noble purpose: something which the society they have rejected could not provide in their eyes.

With this understanding, it becomes clear that pragmatism sometimes be the antithesis of the dedicated Western terrorist. His romanticized ideals often conflict with the harsh realities of the terrorist life style.

Another common characteristic of many terrorists of the West is low self-esteem. In this case, the terrorist's lack of esteem for himself finds relief in the effect he can have on his target population. The very fact that so many people fear him is extremely satisfying. This is his way of compensating for what he lacks.

The lust for power is and has been a major motivation for violence since the beginning of recorded history. It is likely that there are many in the terrorist ranks who desire power but are frustrated in their attempts to gain it in conventional ways. Terror is power to these people. They have the capacity to kill those whom they choose and the ability to spread their acts, if not always their names, over the front pages of newspapers worldwide. To them this is personal gratification of the highest order. Accounts of terrorists rushing out to buy newspapers in order to read about their exploits are not unheard of, particularly in West Germany. They often consider themselves underground celebrities and enjoy the notoriety.

In order to achieve the power they so greatly desire, they will form alliances with criminals, work with other unassociated terrorist groups, and kill anyone who stands in their way.

Finally, terrorism is exciting. For the bored, overindulged and alienated children of wealth, violence is the ultimate form of self-expression, freedom and self-indulgence. At least initially, acts of violence may be seen as fun. (It must be remembered that these youths are not well adjusted "average" persons. They suffer from a malaise brought on by the contradictions and confusion of their homes and societies.) Fun for some terrorists is the periodic psychological release they receive while involved in acts of destruc-

tion steeped in blood.

The aforementioned societal and psychological factors should not be considered separately but instead as a whole. Although a Western terrorist as an individual would probably not possess all the problems outlined, it is a fair certainty that he would have many. It is the combination of a number of these characteristics that leads to the eventual creation of a Western terrorist.

The Red Brigades

The Red Brigades terrorist movement in Italy is a left-oriented organization. They are Marxist-Leninist politically and, surprisingly, solidly against the Italian Communist Party (PCI). A study commissioned by the SCI claims that "there are 700 to 800 terrorists living in Italy's underground, and up to 10,000 persons who actively support terrorist activities."[4] Since 1968, acts of violence perpetuated by the Red Brigades have been steadily on the climb.

It should be noted that statistics printed in the January 23, 1978, issue of **Time Magazine** state that Italy possesses 94 leftist terror organizations and 21 neo-fascist terror groups. This plethora of movements makes study of Italian terrorism extremely difficult. The choice of the Red Brigades as representative was due to its large size and because it is the best known group of its type in Italy.

> Terrorism in Italy and in other industrialized societies is often explained as the product of psychological alienation resulting from rapid technological progress not accompanied by a simultaneous development in parallel social structures and accommodations.[5]

In Italy, the technological revolution resulted in population migration from the predominantly rural south to the industrial cities of the north. These cities were ill-equipped to handle the population influx. Schools, housing, hospitals and sanitation services were pressed beyond their limits. The largely Centrist government which had engineered Italy's "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s could not handle the resulting social problems contingent to progress. The university-inspired and student-led "Cultural Revolution" of 1968 was a challenge directed not only at the educational system but at the church, government and family as well. The structure through which Italians had traditionally lived their lives was regarded as antiquated and no longer of use by youth.

. . .the intellectuals of the far right will be joining a clusterful of jailed intellectuals who are responsible for the far-left terrorism.

It is noteworthy that during the 1968 "Cultural Revolution," it was the schools where the humanities and social sciences were taught that provided the impetus to action. Universities that taught business, science and law were noticeably quiet. Although student protesters at the time were demanding school reforms, an end to the Vietnam War and the creation of a new society, the issue of jobs was seldom heard. The fact was, Italy had little use and even fewer jobs for those trained in the social sciences and humanities. This had to be a frustration for students in those fields of endeavor. This frustration could have led to terrorist violence for some.

> This is so because of the crisis in state education, which represents one of the principal causes of intellectual unemployment; the dissatisfaction deriving from the practical impossibility of making use of educational qualifications because of lack of demand is a reason for dangerous frustration, this is potentially disruptive. It is well-known how unemployment breeds an inborn stimulus, also irrational, toward violent behavior.[6]

The university was and still is an ideal setting for radical thinking in Italy. . . after the capture of Antonio Negri, a professor and prime supporter of the Brigate Rosse, Italy was shocked. A professor could not be involved in such dealings, many believed. However, after the Bologna bomb blast **The Economist** ran an article entitled "Dons of War" (September 6, 1980). It put the blame of terrorism upon the shoulders of academia, noting that. . . the intellectuals of the far right will be joining a clusterful of jailed intellectuals who are responsible for the far-left terrorism of the past few years, headed by Professor Negri. With teachers like these, Italy's young can hardly be blamed for flocking to the cause of Terrorism.[7]

The workers of Italy, up until 1969, had been both moderate and responsible. In that year strikes, union violence and demonstrations were constantly in the headlines. Union demands began to stretch Italy's economic structure to its limits. It is logical to assume that student unrest of the previous year had acted as a catalyst for working class unrest.

The PCI had abandoned its earlier, more radical views, and joined with the moderate Christian Democrats and Socialists in coalition at the local level of government. Accommodation and moderation were prevalent in the PCI's with the Christian Democrats. These two parties that had been enemies for decades, now attempted to seek accord. Many of Italy's politicized

and educated youth saw this PCI stand as an utter betrayal of the masses. These youths provided the fodder for the Red Brigades.

This terrorist organization was born in this era of government permissiveness, student unrest and labor strikes. Although it was the contradictions of Italian society which led to terrorism, it was the PCI which provided the intellectual framework for the Red Brigades' ideology. The hard-line Communist stance taken by the PCI in the 1950s was adopted by the Red Brigades. Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer of the PCI led his party to moderation and is considered a traitor by the terrorists. When the Red Brigades reference the PCI in their propaganda literature, they do not refer to "the PCI" but instead to "Berlinguer's Party."

This is demonstrative of the alienation felt by these youths. First they reject the government in power, then they reject the government's opposition. They see violence as the only logical door left open to them.

Given the mass migration of Italians from rural to urban areas, the city has become a symbol of the dysfunctional state. "It is just in the city and against the city that terrorists concentrate their attack."[8] Not only are the targets of the Red Brigades most often in the city, but the urban environment provides security for the terrorists themselves. It is here where safe houses are designated, sympathizers abound and, most importantly, fear can be quickly spread.

To understand the Red Brigades' terrorists, it might be helpful to look at some of their ideology. The following passages are excerpts from their own propaganda.

> Our commitment in the factories and the districts has been from the beginning that of organizing proletarian autonomy for the resistance against the counter-revolution in progress and against the liquidation of revolutionary upsurges attempted by the opportunists and revisionists. Organizing resistance and constructing proletariat armed power are the directives that guided and guide our revolutionary work. What has all this to do with terrorism. . . ?
> Urban guerrilla warfare plays a decisive role in the action of political disarticulation of the regime and the State. It hits the enemy directly and paves the way for the movement of resistance movement and the Autonomous area is constructed and articulated and not vice-versa. Enlarging this area means in the first place organizing the guerrilla war, its political capacity and fire power. . .
> We believe that armed action is only the culminating moment of a vast political work by means of which the proletarian avant-garde and the movement of resistance is organized directly in respect of its real and immediate needs. In other words for the Red Brigades armed action in the highest point of a thorough class work: it is its prospect of power. . .[9]

Urban Guerrilla Warfare. . . works only so long as the state being fought adheres to some extent to democratic laws . . .

The above lines are crucial to understanding the Red Brigades. The romantic idea of a proletarian avant-garde, the reference to power, warfare and organization all tell of the unrealistic and unrealizable goals they have set for themselves. This is obviously a perverted off-shoot of Marxist-Leninist theory, but could also possess an almost fanciful quality. How could they believe such writings as these? The answer to this question might be understood after considering what the Red Brigades have rejected. The government, society, family, church and accompanying structures of these institutions have all lost credibility with the terrorist. For the persons who feel this way, terrorism provides an opportunity to change all that they have rejected. If understanding their ideology can provide some insight into the Italian terrorists' minds, then an examination of one of their acts might also prove enlightening.

The kidnapping of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades on March 16, 1978, was by far the single most headline-grabbing incident that they had ever staged. The choice of Moro as their target was perfect in their view. He was the leader of the Christian Democrats and a prominent moderate. Christian Democracy is another name for capitalism in the eyes of the Italian terrorists, and moderation leads to perpetuation of compromises and accommodation. In this context, compromise and accommodation mean the continuance of the status quo, and the status quo of what the terrorists hope to destroy.

> The Red Brigades quickly put Moro on trial before a so-called people's tribunal and predictably, condemned him to death as an enemy of the proletariat, then demanded the release of 13 jailed terrorists as the price of his life.[10]

The mock trial was an attempt to legitimize the terrorist action. By going through the charade of a tribunal, they hoped to demonstrate to others the righteousness of their cause. The kidnapping of Moro as opposed to a simple execution in the streets riveted national and international attention on the drama for 54 days, something an

execution could not have hoped for.

> In mid-April, when a terrorist hideout was raided and some incriminating documents were seized, no one was surprised to discover that Berlinguer (leader of the PCI) himself was the first choice of the kidnappers. He turned out to be too well protected to attack. . . [11]

The choice of Berlinguer as a target would also have been perfect. As probably the leading moderate Communist in Europe, Berlinguer was a symbol of the betrayal of socialist conscience to the Red Brigades.

> The actual discovery (on 9 May 1978). . . of Moro's body, riddled with bullets, in a car abandoned in the middle of the city, at a point almost equidistant from the party headquarters of the Communists and the Christian Democrats, was an event that horrified the nation.[12]

The fact that the car was found midway between the two parties' headquarters was no coincidence. In this way, the terrorists demonstrated their utter contempt for both parties, and a possible warning toward the future.

The attacks of the Red Brigades have been primarily centered on the government and the government's representatives. It is no mistake that Giovanni Leone still lives. Leone was revealed as the most corrupt government official possible prior to Moro's death. A former president of Italy, he was forced to resign in view of the political corruption that surrounded him. More importantly to the terrorists, he was not punished. Leone is a living symbol of the corruption of Italian government. The view that the common man goes to jail for breaking the law and the rich man changes jobs is a pervasive view in Italy. The Red Brigades find propaganda value in men like Leone and would probably wish them long life. As dead men, they become only history.

In Italy, the causes of terrorism are multiple: Western society's contradictions, the breakdown of the family, leftist professors who extol Marxism, the loss of credibility in the Western institutions of the church, governmet, and business, and the psychological factors contingent to the dilemma.

. . . for the Red Brigades armed action is the highest point of a thorough class work: it is the prospect of power. . .

There is no ready solution for these problems; and therefore, no immediate solution to the terrorist problem in Italy. This is not to infer that the Red Brigades cannot be stopped. If the government is willing to institute repressive enough measures, terrorism can be halted. But the larger governmental, societal, and psychological problems which provided the impetus for terrorism in Italy continue.

The Baader-Meinhof Gang or Red Army Faction

Like the Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang (BMG) has its roots in the student unrest in 1968. It is a Marxist-Leninist organization; but unlike the Italian model, there is no cohesive ideological framework. Whereas the Red Brigades had developed their ideology from the PCI's hard line platform of the 1950s, there was no such example for the BMG. They had no ideological framework on which to build; and thus, they lacked the credibility of the Red Brigades.

The BMG, more so than the Red Brigades, can be better understood through its leaders. Due to its lack of codified ideals, the organization bears the personal characteristics of its creators.

Andreas Baader was an only child, raised by his mother, aunt, and grandmother. The boy became spoiled and was difficult to handle with all this feminine attention. He was brought up in a middle-class environment and attended private schools. He was bright and ". . . tended to be romantic."[13] "At sixteen, Andreas was reading Sartre, Nietzsche, and Balzac."[14] Although he was intelligent and possibly gifted, the structure of the classroom was too much for him. He would never finish his high school education.

Ello Michel, a painter who lived with her husband, became Baader's lover in 1964. Baader detested work and lived on a allowance given to him by Ello and part of his mother's social security checks. "He wore $100 shoes, custom-made silk shirts with his monogram on the collar, and velvet suits. He was partial to rare perfumes, and in order to show off what he considered to be his wonderful buttocks, he never wore underpants."[15]

This man can only be described as a gigolo. For excitement, he stole cars and took up burglary. He would lie about his past to women he hoped to impress. He was described by people who knew him as vicious, spoiled, and manipulative. He apparently had a charismatic quality that allowed him to dominate women. This is one possible explanation for the great number of women who eventually joined the BMG. He was a heavy drinker and a brawler. His daughter, born of Ello, was treated with indifference. This is the man who would lead the Red Army Faction, as it would be called later, to acts of violence under the flag of political ter-

rorism. Psychologically, this individual possesses many of the characteristics outlined earlier in this work.

Ulrike Meinhof was the daughter of the Director of the Museum of Jena who died when she was a young girl. She was raised by her mother and Renate Riemeck, a prominent leftist professor. Under this tutelage, her political education started early. She had an exemplary academic record, and took degrees in Sociology and Philosophy. Her later marriage to a leftist publisher ended in divorce. She supported leftist ideals as the editor of **Konkret**; and as such, she became a well-known and celebrated socialist journalist of the 1960s.

After her divorce, she moved to West Berlin with her twin daughters and took up the cause of underpriviledged children. She had lived the life of a distinctly upper middle-class individual, and yet she identified with the poor. " 'She knew she was a living lie,' said Renate Riemeck, 'cavorting with the rich and yearning to liberate the poor.' "[16]

She was frustrated by writing. She longed to take a more active role, to have effect, and to change the society in which she lived. In May of 1970, she took that step when she helped Andreas Baader escape from prison.

By this time, Baader had become well-known for the April 2, 1968, bombing of two of Frankfurt's largest department stores with his lover Gudrun Ensslin. It was for this crime that he had been jailed.

Gudrun was raised the daughter of a Lutheran minister. She was extremely intelligent and attended Tubingen University where she studied Philosophy, English and German. She became a writer, acted in pornographic movies and eventually had a child out of wedlock. She later attended the Free University in West Berlin.

Although she was an early pacifist, her views changed radically when a fellow student was killed by police in the student unrest of that era (1968). " 'They'll kill us all' Gudrun shouted in one of her speeches. 'You know what kind of pigs we're up against. This is the Auschwitz generation we've got against us. You can't argue with the people who made Auschwitz.' "[17]

. . . She knew she was a living lie. . . cavorting with the rich and yearning to liberate the poor. . .

This is a reference to the past which amply demonstrates the sense of estrangement young Germans felt toward their past. They reject their past, the social order and pacifism. In a note found at her apartment, Gudrun justified the department store bombings. "We set fires in department stores so that you will stop buying. The compulsion to buy terrorizes you."[18]

Her reference to the West German consumer economy seems to be at the heart of their personal motivation. It was not the government that was chosen as their first target, but a symbol the capitalist society. It is not just the overthrow of the government which they seek, but the collapse of society itself.

Through these three individuals, it may be possible to better understand the substance of German terrorism. They were certainly alienated from their society and fit the middle-class prototype outlined earlier. It seems that, like the Red Brigades, their goal was fanciful, unrealistic, and certainly romantic. "In Italy, the Red Brigades formed as a reaction to the failure of Italian society, but in Germany the actions of the Baader-Meinhof Gang were directed at the very success of that society."[19]

The grand coalition of the Social Democrats and the conservatives in 1966 within the German government may have given rise to the feeling that there was no longer a hope for change. The government in general was stoutly conservative. The youth of the 1968 student revolts would not accept gradualism.

The German university system also abetted the creation of terrorism. The number of students at universities more than doubled prior to the 1968 revolts. Vietnam, the bomb, and Marxism provided the confusing backdrop for the violence of radicalism. The feelings of impotence to affect radical social change provided the impetus to action.

Their sense of solidarity with Third World terrorist organizations was enhanced when Baader, Gudrun, and others received terrorist training from the PLO in Jordan. Carlos Marighela's book on **The Urban Guerrilla** provided further guidance in the "how" of terrorism. The longing of this group belong to something outside themselves was provided in this way.

" 'The Guerrilla's Language is action,' Baader had once said."[20] The writings of his favorite author, Jean Paul Sartre, supported his view. The action included bank robbery, bombings, and murder; but unlike his brethern of the Red Brigades, Baader was quite content to spend the money stolen from the banks on himself. The contradictions of his acts never seemed to cause him or Gudrun to pause for reflection. He wanted to fully enjoy the fruits of the consumer economy that he was attempting to destroy. Baader was not a purist in the sense and certainly

no idealist. It is interesting to note that Gudrun was later apprehended by the police while shopping in a fashionable Hamburg boutique.

Due to the BMG's lack of an ideological framework, they bombed U.S. military installations, police headquarters, the wife of a federal judge and the Springer building in Hamburg. This piecemeal approach to targets created great consternation in the sympathies of radical-left supporters. "The Baader-Meinhof Gang lost all of its remaining sympathy and now found it practically impossible to obtain assistance of any kind. "[21]This was the beginning of the end. All the major members of the group were arrested within weeks. Baader was captured June 1, 1972.

Following years of incarceration, trial, hunger strikes and attempts by their free comrades to have them released, Ulrike Meinhof committed suicide May 8, 1976. Baader, Gudrun, and one other, Jan-Carl Raspe, took their own lives on October 18, 1977. Irmgard Moller attempted suicide at the same time but survived the attempt.

What had happened? This small group of supposed idealists were once the darlings of the chic and radical left in Germany. In fact, Meinhof was turned in by a former sympathizer. Certainly the cause lives on as recent bombings in Germany testify. To those who continue their struggle, Baader and Meinhof provide perverted martyrs to the cause. But what is the cause?

To Baader, the cause may have appeared to be the struggle itself. The spoiled, egotistical, and disenchanted boy never grew up. Excitement, the thirst for power, and self-indulgence characterized his life. His lack of concrete ideals probably led to his eventual demise.

Meinhof, carrying the cause of underpriviledged children and the radical left as her banners, was never able to effectively influence the group. She was the high idealist of the BMG, and it should be no surprise that she was the first to take her own life. At one time the most articulate spokesman of the left, she died in utter frustration and despair.

their movement was more introverted and therefore less understood. Their acts of destruction sprang from frustration within

Conclusion

The Western terrorists of Italy and Germany are far too complex to lump together in one category or categories. They are a product of our times, society, family, and the psychological factors contingent on them. The advent of the new technological age, mass migrations to the cities, permissive homes, liberal university educations, and the impotent feelings of youth all added fuel to the terrorist fire.

The difference between the BMG and the Red Brigades are substantial. The Italian terrorists fight against a government which is poorly run, where the distribution of wealth is skewed toward the top, where corruption is widespread, and where the powerful and wealthy are often not punished for their crimes. The BMG has no such clarion call. In Germany, there exists one of the highest standards of living in the world, the highest-paid workers,and an enormous middle class. Germany has continually funded massive social programs for the poor. In Germany, nobody starves.

The BMG must be understood differently. The German terrorists, lacking the external reasons for violence, had to look internally. Their movement was more introverted and therefore less understood. Their acts of destruction sprang from frustration within: estrangement with the past, boredom, and impotence. It was a means to search for self-expression and a pretense for action. Their reasoning could not stand the harsh light of day. Even their sympathizers abandoned them in the end.

The following is an excerpt from an interview with Michael "Bommi" Baumann. He was called "Bommi" because of his proficiency at making bombs for the BMG.

> BAUMANN: From our point of view Fascism in the West German Federal Republic had not been overcome; from our point of view it was growing again at the end of the 1960s. We did not want to look on helplessly as people did in 1933.
> INTERVIEWER: Looking at it ten years later, was that analysis correct?
> BAUMANN: It was wrong, at any rate so far as the timing was concerned. There's also something else we can see now. Urban guerrilla warfare as a form of struggle has collapsed all over the world. It works only so long as the state that is being fought adheres to some extent to democratic laws. . . [22]

Footnotes

1. Herbert A. Kampf, "On the Appeals of Extremism to the Youth of Affluent, Democratic Societies," **Terrorism: An International Journal,** Vol. 4, pp. 161-193, 1980.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78," **Terrorism: An International Journal,** Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4, pp. 171-211, 1979.

5. Ibid.
6. Ernesto Fiorillo, "Terrorism in Italy: Analysis of a Problem," **Terrorism: An International Journal,** Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4, pp. 261-269, 1979.
7. Larry Edward Bloom, "Italian Terrorism: A Bibliographical Essay," unpublished bibliographical essay, American University, Washington, D.C., October 19, 1981, pp. 5-6.
8. Fiorillo, op. cit.,pp, 261-269.
9. Percy Allum, "Political Terrorism in Italy," **Contemporary Review,** Vol. 233, pp. 75-82, August 1978.
10. William Murray, "Letter From Rome," **New Yorker,** Vol. 54, pp. 70-75, July 17, 1978.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Jon Bradshaw, "The Dream of Terror," **Esquire,** pp. 24-50, July 18, 1978.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Neil Curry, "The Mind of a German Terrorist," **Encounter,** Vol. 51, pp. 81-88, September 1978.
21. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 24-50.
22. Curry, op. cit. pp. 81-88.

Capt. Robert B. Adolph, Jr., holds a BS in Sociology from the University of the State of New York. His military education includes the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence and Counterintelligence Officer Basic Courses; Airborne, Ranger, SCUBA, Jumpmaster, Special Forces, Russian and Arabic Language Schools, and the Military Officer's Advanced Course. He is presently pursuing a MA in Western European Area Studies at American University in Washington, D.C. Adolph has served as operations officer, 218th MID; executive officer, Hqs & Opns., 525th MI Group; a Special Forces detachment commander and Battalion S2, 3d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Mandate—(Continued from page 29)
killed by a terrorist.

Before any operation the terrorists engage in detailed intelligence gathering efforts of their own involving surveillance of their intended victim's routine activities. As soon as they have established a predictable pattern of behavior, they strike.

Under the direction of Levy, USAICS has been preparing to meet the needs of the MI specialist with a counterterrorist mission. Levy is writing a new Counterterrorism Intelligence Field Manual. Blocks of instruction have been designed to be taught to all students at all levels taking MOS training and professional development courses at the Intelligence School.

There is general agreement among those who have a firm grasp of this important subject that a prelude to war will be a well-orchestrated attack on major sources of power, communications routes, and national-level leaders throughout the United States. These attacks will be carried out by international terrorists believed to be already infiltrated into the United States. For instance, the screening of those Cubans who entered the U.S. during the recent Cuban flotilla episode, several individuals were identified as graduates of Camp Matanzas, the Cuban terror school. Subsequent escapes from detention centers have been professionally effected.

When one views the vulnerability of our open society to terrorist attack, and the prospect of our nation paralyzed before a single shot is fired, the importance of the MI counterterrorism mission is obvious.

Lt. Patt is a graduate of Stanford University. He completed OCS where he earned a commission in Military Intelligence. The graduate of the MIOBC and 36A course, counterintelligence, is currently assigned to the intelligence coordination division at INSCOM.

CORRECTION

The OPFOR article published in the Summer, 1982 issue of MI Magazine was, in fact, submitted as two separate articles. The first article, submitted by MSG Larry Hodge, should have ended with the paragraph just before the subheading, "BACKGROUND." The remainder of the article actually constituted the lead-off article for the OPFOR series, provided by the OPFOR Branch, USAICS.

USAISD Notes

USAISD CSM Retires

CSM Roland A. Van Dyne, former command sergeant major of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Devens, retired from the Army on April 30 after more than 29 years of service.

Van Dyne was awarded the Legion of Merit on April 29 for his service to the U.S. Army and USAISD.

His assignments included tours of duty in France, Vietnam, Germany, Korea, Belgium, Fort Campbell, Ky., Fort Sill, Okla., and Fort Devens. He spent the major portion of his military career serving in the transportation field.

Van Dyne, his wife Susan and their daughter Leslie, now reside in Kennebunk, Maine. Van Dyne has been replaced as USAISD CSM by CSM Jack B. Huggins.

USAISD Instructors of the Month for April, May and June

USAISD has named its top instructors for the months of April, May and June, 1982.

SSgt. Vernon Gates was named April Instructor of the Month. He is an instructor with the Advanced Electronic Maintenance Division, Maintenance Training Department, Directorate of Training and Doctrine at USAISD.

The USAISD Instructor of the Month for May was Sgt. Thomas L. Varichak. He is assigned to the Morse Code Trainer-4 Section of the Communications Intelligence Department, Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

In June, the Instructor of the Month was SSgt. Wayne L. Caudill. Like Varichak, Caudill is an instructor with the Morse Code Trainer-4 Section at USAISD.

Air Force Base Changes to 'Fort Goodfellow'

The week of June 1-7, 1982 was proclaimed as "Army Week" at San Angelo, Texas, by Mayor Tom R. Parrett.

In honor of the Army's 207th birthday on June 14, Parrett declared all references to Goodfellow Air Force Base (where USAISD has one of two detachments) "shall be made, instead, to Fort Goofellow."

A "Fort Goodfellow" sign was placed over the entrance gate of the Air Force base and an official proclomation was made by the city of San Angelo which said for local citizens to render honor in remembrance of the countless soldiers, both past and present, who have unselfishly given their lives in defense of freedoms this country enjoy.

Old Crows Flock to USAISD to Talk EW

The Patriots' Roost Chapter of the Association of Old Crows got together recently at Fort Devens to discuss U.S. Army warfare in the Airland Battle and to hear guest speaker Brig. Gen. Richard Wilmot, commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

After receiving a briefing and viewing a static display of EW equipment on Rogers Field, members of the Old Crows enjoyed a barbecue at the Fort Devens NCO Club.

The Association of Old Crows is comprised of professional individuals engaged in the science of Electronic Warfare. The membership includes scientists and engineers, technical and program managers and military people.

The AOC was officially organized in 1964 and has since grown to over 40 clubs or "roosts" with over 8,000 members. The Old Crows work for the advancement of EW, with the full cooperation of the Department of Defense, by hosting numerous technical meetings and symposia throughout the country, such as the recent one at Fort Devens.

About half of the AOC membership is made up of Army, Navy, Air Force and other DoD personnel. The other half of the membership is from the industrial and educational community, representing both large and small companies and a number of university research centers.

The Patriots' Roost of the AOC has a membership of about 500 and serves the northeastern part of New England. Its president is Dr. C.L. John Legere, assistant deputy commandant for Training Systems Management, USAISD. The Patriots' Roost is not the largest in the AOC, but it has pioneered many nationally adopted ideas and undertakings and is one of the most active roosts.

Membership centers around the Air Force activity at Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass., the Army activity at Fort Devens and the electronics centers in the northern New England area.

Enlisted Notes

Language Volunteers

The Army needs volunteers for language trained soldiers in PMOS 96B, 96C, 97B, and 98C. Languages with most severe shortages are:

MOS 96B: Russian, Czech, Polish, German, and Japanese
MOS 96C: Russian, Polish, Czech, Chinese Mandaran, Arabic, and, for airborne qualified soldiers only, Spanish
MOS 97B: German and Korean
MOS 98C: Korean, Chinese Mandarin, German, Polish, Czech, Russian, Hungarian, and Arabic

Soldiers should be aware that training is not available at all grades for some languages. Language courses are normally taught at the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, Calif., and range in length from 25 to 47 weeks. Prerequisites include a minimum score of 89 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB), a final SECRET clearance and normal hearing acuity. Other are stated in AR 611-6.

Applications should be submitted so as to arrive at MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPT-I no later than 10 months prior to DEROS for overseas-based soldiers (eight months from short tour areas), or eight months prior to end of stabilization or projected rotation date for CONUS-based soldiers. Applications may include a choice of up to three languages, or the soldier may allow DA to select the most suitable course of study. Further information can be found in AR 611-6, or by contacting the appropriative Professional Development NCO at MP/MI Branch.

Bonus Extension and Retraining (BEAR) Program, CMF 98

The success of the BEAR program in recruiting in-service applicants for CMF 98 in MOS 98C (EW/SIGINT Analyst), MOS 98G (EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor), and MOS 98J (EW/SIGINT Noncommunications Interceptor), has created a personnel security problem. A Top Secret security clearance with access to sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI) is required prior to entry into MOS training.

A TS/SCI clearance is contingent upon a favorable Special Background Investigation (SBI), including an evaluation of the individual's personal characteristics and potential capabilities. Due to the length investigative time, an average of 215 days, service schools have been authorized to grant an interim TS/SCI security clearance, provided the individual has an open SBI case file at Defense Investigative Service (DIS). The case must have progressed through a favorable National Agency Check and local records check with no derogatory information discovered.

The failure of losing installations to ensure that CMF 98 BEAR applicants had requested an SBI resulted in a great number of soliders arriving at training installations without the necessary security clearance and access. This situation meant not only the loss of a training seat and wasteful expenditure of TDY funds, but created a hardship on those soldiers who had relocated their families at their own expense.

To remedy the problem, MILPERCEN MILPO Message Number 82-48, 221500Z December 1981, Subject: BEAR Program, directed that BEAR applicants for an MOS in CMF 98 submit an SBI request as an inclosure to the BEAR application. The SBI packet will include the following documents: DD Form 398 - seven copies; DD Form 1584 - four copies (four each for applicant and spouse); DD Form 1879 - four copies; DD Form 2221 - one copy; FD Form 258 - two copies; and a DA Circular 604 series (Personnel Security Clearance and Personnel Security Program) screening interview statement. CMF 98 applicants are not subject to Procedure 3-33, DA Pam 600-8 as are MOS 97B applicants.

Joint Firepower Control Course

Additional skill identifier (ASI) Q8 has been recently authorized for soldiers awarded MOS 96B. This course teaches the concepts, procedures, and techniques of joint combat operations and the coordination and control systems employed to integrate service efforts. It describes the command structure, organization weapons, and control systems employed in the AirLand battle. Soldiers possessing MOS 96B are currently being scheduled for attendance TDY enroute to oversea or CONUS assignments to ensure maximum seat fill. Course length is 11 days and taught at U.S. Air Force Air Ground Operations School, Eglin AFB, Fla. Volunteers in grade E-5 and above, should submit DA Form 4187, Personnel Action Request, through channels to DA MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPT-F. Each request should indicate whether training is requested for TDY enroute or TDY and return status.

Cheap War-(Continued from page 15)

Division and, accordingly, corps must also rely on brigade S2s to present an accurate picture of brigade areas of concern. These are the enemy forces which must be defeated now, before facing the second echelon. The intelligence community must already have its analysis zeroed like an infantryman with his M16. With this, the division commander can maximize his profit through the thorough use of his assets.

Not everyone works on a commander's staff. Personnel from EWD battalions, MI groups and other intelligence related activities are needed to act as Soviet commanders, accurately portraying a realistic battlefield by Soviet doctrine.

"First Battle" takes the intelligence community out of the shadows of physical security, crime prevention and arms room security into its real world—intelligence. No matter what intelligence job you're filling, you'll feel the impact of division or corps level CPX. You'll be challenged and have the opportunity to challenge.

Lt. Etnyre is a ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate from Texas Christian University where he earned a BA in Finance. He completed the MIOB 35A and 5M courses. Presently a platoon leader with A Company, 2nd Bn, 7th Cavalry. Etnyre was previously the S-2 of the 2nd Bn, 7th Cavalry. He is Airborne qualified.

ACRONINT?

by Capt. Elizabeth A. Checchia, with apologies to LT Dave Chanberlain, USN

Ever get the feeling the Army is acronym crazy? If you try to keep up with evolving doctrine and materiel development, you'll find yourself afloat in a sea of alphabet soup. Each new program or system creates its attendant horde of acronyms. Some of them are clever—SPIDER (Systematic Planning for Integrated Defense Engineering and Research), or MAGIIC (Mobile Army Ground Imagery Interpretation Center), for example. Some, like C^{3}CM (Command, Control, Communications Countermeasures), belong in a mathematical equation. Some acronyms spawn others, like TACIES (Tactical Imagery Exploitation System) Interface Element, the TIE. Some are simply confusing: does CE mean Communications-Electronics, Corps of Engineers, Circular Error, Cost Effectiveness, Civil Engineer(ing), Current Exploitation or something else?

The intelligence field is riddled with acronyms—CEWI, ASAS, IPB, SOTAS (now BDS), TRIGS, etc. The "INTs" have experienced the most spectacular growth. Not so long ago, HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT were all you needed to stay on top of this multi-disciplined business. Today there's an extended family of INTs out there waiting to trip you up. See how many of the following INTs you recognize:

ACINT—acoustical intelligence
ACOUSTINT—acoustical
COMINT—communications
ELECTRO-OPTINT—electro-optic
EOINT—electro-optic
ELINT—electronic
FISINT—foreign instrumentation signals
HUMINT—human
IMINT—imagery
LASINT—laser
LITINT—literature
MASINT—measurement and signature
MEDINT—medical
NUINT—nuclear
OPTINT—optical
PHOTINT—photographic
RADINT—radar
RINT—radiation
SEISINT—seismic
SIGINT—signals
TACINT—tactical
TELINT—telemetry

There are, of course, some alternate solutions in the "deacronymization" of members of the INT family. If laser and radar (themselves acronyms) intelligence are LASINT and RADINT, respectively, the MASINT could be maser intelligence. TELINT could be telecommunications or telephone intelgence. EOINT, by all rights, should be equal opportunity intelligence.

For the sake of order, future coiners of INTs should use up some of the unused letters of the alphabet: XINT would, of course, be X-ray intelligence; DATINT, data intelligence; and WINT or WXINT, weather intelligence. Those with time on our hands, or crossword puzzle addicts, can explore the possibilities of the more exotic INTs—GLINT, SPRINT, POINT, etc. Then again, maybe someone, somewhere could put an end to INT proliferation and bring back the use of the English language. In this case, the first **INT** to go should be **LITINT** —seems to me the word "reading" is perfectly satisfactory.

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Themes for FY 83 are listed below:

The themes are not intended to squelch your ingenuity, but rather to assist you by providing a point of departure and to focus on some important issues in the intelligence community.

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Philosophy
People

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Problems/shortcomings
Tailoring CEWI

IEW and the AirLand Battle
April-June 1983
(submit manuscripts by 1 March)
Intelligence challenge of the AirLand Battle
IEW requirements
Importance of the IEW role

U.S. Military Intelligence
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Style: Military Intelligence Magazine is your platform for communicating with the intelligence community; for that reason, write in an informal manner. Develop a rapport with your audience. Write concisely and in the active voice. Begin by capturing the reader's intrigue. Guide him/her into the core of the article and conclude by recapping the main points of your paper.

Explain unfamiliar terms and limit their use, avoid acronyms and confusing sentences. Insure that you are completely satisfied with your manuscript prior to submission. A manuscript may need revising several times before you are happy with it.

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Summary: If you are interested in a subject, chances are that others will be too. Pick a subject, thoroughly research it, and think all your ideas through. Write with enthusiasm, but be natural. Don't adopt a different style.

For more information, contact the Editor, Military Intelligence Magazine, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-MG *(Military Intelligence)*, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. Autovon 879-3033; commercial (602) 538-3033.

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